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Abstract
An estimated 60,000 forensic evaluations are conducted annually to determine if
defendants meet the legal standard of competence to stand trial (CST); that is, if
defendants have the ability to consult with their attorney, as well as if they have a rational
and factual understanding of their charges. Estimated rates of feigning (i.e., faking or
exaggerating of deficits or symptoms) in CST evaluations have ranged from 8% to 21%.
Given this prevalence, it is necessary for forensic evaluators to have access to
psychometrically sound instruments that can aid in the detection of feigning. Performance
validity tests (PVTs) are designed to detect poor effort and response styles indicative of
feigning. The Inventory of Legal Knowledge (ILK) is a PVT that was designed to detect
feigned incompetence to stand trial. The current study examined the usefulness of the
ILK in a psychiatric inpatient sample for the detection of feigning, with a focus on the
instrument’s psychometric properties. Support was found for adequate reliability;
however, evidence for construct and convergent validity were lacking. Several items that
were long in length and had correct answers of “false” appeared to be difficult for the
participants. Prior incarceration, having a forensic status, and a later onset of illness were
related to higher ILK total scores. Future research recommendations, as well as concerns
regarding the use of the ILK in inpatient settings were also addressed.
Keywords: competence to stand trial, feigning, forensic evaluations, performance
validity tests, psychometric properties
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Inventory of Legal Knowledge:
An Examination of Psychometric Properties in an Inpatient Psychiatric Setting
CHAPTER ONE
Literature Review
1.1 Competence to Stand Trial (CST)
Evaluations of competence to stand trial (CST), also known as adjudicative
competence, are the most commonly conducted forensic evaluations in the United States,
with an estimated 60,000 conducted annually (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000). CST is a legal
standard that was set forth by the United States Supreme Court decision known as Dusky
v. United States (1960). There are two main criteria outlined in the decision that a
defendant must meet in order to be declared competent. The first is that the defendant
should have a “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding” (Dusky v. United States, 1960, p. 402). The defendant
must also have a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him” (Dusky v. United States, 1960, p. 402). The Dusky (1960) standard has been
criticized for its vague language, as there is no universal understanding of the criteria nor
a standardized tool for assessing competency (Cooper & Zapf, 2003; Otto, 2006). A
common interpretation of the reference to “present ability” is that the evaluation of a
defendant’s competency should be based on the defendant’s current abilities (Otto, 2006).
Moreover, the abilities of the defendant should be considered in terms of the foreseeable
demands of the defendant’s legal case (Otto, Musick, & Sherrod, 2010). The specification
of “rational as well as factual understanding” has been interpreted to mean that
competence related abilities are more than knowledge of legal facts; rather, a defendant
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should be able to appreciate the nature of the charges and potential implications, and
reason through the proceedings (Golding, Roesch, & Schrieber, 1984; Otto, 2006; Otto et
al., 2010). A common interpretation consistent with the Dusky (1960) language of
“reasonable degree of rational understanding,” is that in order to be declared CST, a
defendant must be able to understand the legal proceedings and assist in his or her
defense in the same way that an “average” defendant in the criminal justice system would
be capable of (Golding et al., 1984). This means that a defendant with a diagnosed
serious mental illness is not necessarily excluded from standing trial; rather, they would
only be deemed incompetent to stand trial (IST) if their symptoms have a substantial
impact on their present abilities to assist their defense attorney or their understanding of
the nature of the proceedings (Golding et al., 1984; Otto, 2006; Tussey, Marcopulos, &
Caillouet, 2013).
CST is a critical legal standard, and is perhaps the most important area within the
legal system to which mental health professionals contribute. Although courts more often
than not agree with the opinion of the forensic evaluator (Zapf, Hubbard, Cooper,
Wheeles, & Ronan, 2004), it is important to note that the concept of competency is
strictly a legal standard. The final decision regarding a defendant’s competence is made
by a legal decision maker. Mental health professionals who conduct CST evaluations
simply provide an opinion regarding a defendant’s present competence related abilities
(Otto, 2006). However, the opinion is an important one. Trying a defendant who does not
meet the criteria as outlined by Dusky (1960) calls into question the reliability of the
entire criminal justice system (Bonnie, 1992; Pirelli, Zapf, & Gottdiener, 2011). It would
be a serious violation of the foundation of the criminal justice system and a defendant’s

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

3

civil rights to hold proceedings against a defendant who lacks basic understanding of the
legal system, who cannot adequately assist his or her lawyer, or who is unable to
appreciate the nature of the charges against him or her (Bonnie, 1992; Pirelli et al., 2011).
In fact, to protect these rights, some states require higher standards than those outlined by
the Dusky (1960) decision (Otto et al., 2010). Potential problems that could result from
trying a defendant who lacks the necessary competence related abilities include a harsher
sentence and denying the defendant needed treatment (Soliman & Resnick, 2010). On the
other hand, it would also be unethical and a violation of human rights to commit a
defendant to a psychiatric facility for competency restoration when the defendant is in
fact competent (Pirelli et al., 2011). Due to the severe consequences of mislabeling a
defendant, it is imperative that forensic evaluators can accurately assess adjudicative
competency (Soliman & Resnick, 2010).
Several methods have been proposed for ensuring that forensic evaluations of
competency are as accurate as possible. Early suggestions by Drob, Berger, and
Weinstein (1987) included evaluating psychiatric symptoms, the effects of the symptoms
on the defendant’s functional capabilities, and the defendant’s ability to participate in
activities specifically relevant to legal proceedings. These areas of evaluation have been
echoed more recently by Otto and colleagues (2010). Specifically, forensic evaluators
must take into account identifiable symptoms of mental illness and how those symptoms
or deficits impact a defendant’s competence-related abilities. Forensic evaluators may
obtain collateral information from jail records, the defense attorney, or the defendant’s
family members in order to build a more accurate picture of the defendant’s competencerelated abilities. Some forensic evaluators may also incorporate competence assessment
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instruments into their evaluations (Otto et al., 2010). Otto and Heilbrun (2002) made a
distinction between forensic assessment instruments and forensically-relevant
instruments. These assessment tools differ in that forensic assessment instruments are
related specifically to the legal standards of Dusky (1960) or other psycholegal domains
(e.g., comprehension of Miranda rights), whereas forensically-relevant instruments are
associated with broader abilities that are typically pertinent to adjudicative competency.
Examples of forensically relevant instruments include instruments designed to detect
malingering and response styles, violence risk assessments, and psychopathy checklists.
1.2 Feigning
One definition of feigning that has been commonly used in the literature is the
deliberate exaggeration or fabrication of symptoms or deficits promoted by an external
incentive (Franzen, Iverson, & McCracken, 1990; Iverson, 2006; Rogers, 1984; Slick,
Sherman, & Iverson, 1999). Feigning often involves both exaggeration of psychological
symptoms and underperformance on cognitive tests (Iverson, 2006). The term is also
synonymous with terms such as malingering, faking, lying, simulating, exaggerating, or
fraud (Iverson, 2006; LoPiccolo, Goodkin, & Baldewicz, 1999). Much emphasis has been
placed on identifying the external incentive, or secondary gain, that serves as motivation
in order to establish that malingering is occurring (Franzen et al.; LoPiccolo et al., 1999;
1990; Slick et al., 1999). This is an important step in the detection of malingering because
it distinguishes malingering from genuine disorders that have seemingly similar
symptoms, such as factitious disorder, somatoform disorders, and dissociative disorders,
which are associated with internal incentives (American Psychiatric Association, 2013;
Iverson, 2006; LoPiccolo et al., 1999; Slick et al., 1999).
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In order to better conceptualize malingering, scholars have proposed several
models of malingering. Rogers (1984; 2008) characterized malingering as a possible
response style that may occur in an evaluation or assessment. A response style describes
how an examinee responds to items on a test; that is, it refers to some systematic way of
responding that is independent of what the items on the test are designed to measure
(Rogers, 1984; 2008). As a response style, feigning typically involves exaggeration of
psychological symptoms or intentionally poor performance on cognitive tasks. Some
examples of response styles indicative of feigning on tests related to psychological
symptoms are reporting symptoms of extreme severity, over-endorsement of symptoms,
and endorsement of rare or contradictory symptoms. Examples of response styles
indicative of feigning on cognitive tests include grossly inaccurate responses on easy
items or items related to general knowledge, poor performance that is significantly
unlikely when compared to performance of reference groups, and performing poorly on
items of a range of difficulty levels (Rogers, 1984; 2008).
Rogers and colleagues described and provided evidence for two explanatory
models of malingering: the pathogenic model and criminological model (Rogers, 1990b;
Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, & Leonard, 1998; Rogers, Sewell, & Goldstein,
1994). The pathogenic model includes feigned symptoms of psychosis, while the
criminological model refers to a motivation for malingering that stems from antisocial
behaviors. The adaptational model was another conceptualization of feigned mental
illness (Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1983). Under this framework, an individual malingers
because they perceive the evaluation or treatment as oppositional and think they have
something to gain from malingering or something to lose from responding honestly
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(Rogers, 1990b; Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1983). A model based on classification of
symptoms was also proposed by Rogers (1990a) to conceptualize malingering. He
proposed classification based on endorsement of rare, indiscriminant, obvious, or
improbable symptoms. Heinze and Purisch (2001) subsequently identified 6 different
types of malingering: indiscriminant endorsement of symptoms, malingered mental
illness, fabrication of neurocognitive deficits, fabrication of affective and cognitive
symptoms, measure-dependent malingering, and unidentifiable approach. This model
emphasizes various types of malingering and various symptoms or deficits one can
malinger.
Defendants undergoing CST evaluations may malinger either psychiatric
symptoms or cognitive deficits in order to delay or avoid legal proceedings and possibly
lengthy sentences or even the death penalty (Iverson & Binder, 2000). Defendants may
also malinger for a myriad of other reasons: to obtain medication or better housing
arrangements while being detained, or to provide a basis for a mental state defense (Otto
et al., 2010). The prevalence of malingering in evaluations of adjudicative competency
has been estimated to range from 8% to 21% (Cornell & Hawk, 1989; Mittenberg, Patton,
Canyock, & Condit, 2002; Rogers et al., 1998; Vitacco, Rogers, Gabel, & Munizza,
2007). The estimated rates have increased over the years, with the earliest rate of 8%
estimated in 1989 by Cornell and Hawk (1989) and the most recent rate of 21% estimated
in 2007 by Vitacco and colleagues (2007). This means that of the 60,000 defendants
evaluated for competency annually (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000), approximately 12,000 of
those defendants malingered.
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1.3 Assessment of Feigning in CST Evaluations
Failing to detect feigning may result in several negative outcomes, such as a
patient or defendant receiving monetary awards they do not deserve, avoiding or delaying
legal proceedings and possible sentences, or obtaining unjust worker’s compensation
(Franzen et al., 1990; Iverson & Binder, 2000; Slick et al., 1999). For these reasons and
the relatively high rates of feigning, it is necessary for forensic evaluators to have reliable
and valid methods for detecting malingered symptoms or cognitive deficits. Slick and
colleagues (1999) were the first to propose a set of specific criteria for clinicians to
consider when “diagnosing” malingering. First, the presence of an external
incentive/secondary gain must be established. Second, there should be some evidence in
support of malingering from neuropsychological testing. This might include a negative
response bias, which is defined as below-chance performance that indicates possible
malingering. Other indicators might be discrepancies between test performance and
patterns of known psychiatric or neurologic conditions, observed behavior, collateral
interviews or reports, and documented history. Third, there should also be evidence from
self-report measures that indicate a discrepancy between self-report history and
documented history, or self-report symptoms and patterns of known disorders,
observations, or information from collateral interviews or reports. It may also be obvious
that the patient or defendant is exaggerating or fabricating symptoms, such endorsement
of very rare manifestations of symptoms. Fourth, it should be established that the
previous criteria are not fully explained by another condition (Slick et al., 1999). Other
scholars have echoed these methods for detecting feigned incompetence or malingered
symptoms. Specifically, obtaining the history of the patient or defendant in an interview
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is important for assessing accuracy and any inconsistencies with documented history
(Iverson & Binder, 2000; Singh, Avasthi, & Grover, 2007). Consistencies and
inconsistencies in behavior should be examined and cross-referenced with documented
history, collateral interviews and reports, and observed behavior in other settings or at
other times (Singh et al., 2007; Soliman & Resnick, 2010). Finally, it is important to
consider differential diagnoses, such as factitious disorder, which is associated with
internal motivations (Iverson & Binder, 2000; Iverson, 2006; Singh et al., 2007).
The detection of malingering is one area in which neuropsychology and forensic
psychology tend to join forces. Neuropsychologists working in forensic settings are
routinely involved in assessing various types of competencies, including competency to
stand trial, and criminal responsibility (Denney & Wynkoop, 2000; Marcopulos, Morgan,
& Denney, 2008; Tussey et al., 2013). Treatment teams of defendants committed to a
psychiatric facility for competency restoration treatment may refer defendants for
neuropsychological evaluations for several reasons. Neuropsychologists are trained to
administer and interpret cognitive tests, and it can be helpful for treatment teams to learn
more about the specific cognitive deficits that impact a particular defendant in order to
better promote the defendant’s restoration to competency (Marcopulos et al., 2008).
Neuropsychologists are also trained to administer tests specifically designed to detect
suboptimal performance that may be indicative of malingering, so treatment teams may
also refer out to neuropsychologists if they suspect that a defendant is malingering
psychiatric symptoms or cognitive deficits (Denney & Wynkoop, 2000). A survey of 64
forensic evaluators showed that 83% endorsed using such assessments in CST
evaluations to gain more information about the cognitive functioning or suspected
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malingering of a defendant (Lally, 2003), which suggests that the contribution of
neuropsychological assessment is welcomed by forensic evaluators. Importantly, it has
been argued that forensic evaluators and neuropsychologists who do not utilize
neuropsychological malingering instruments in their examinations are not meeting the
standards for the profession (Iverson, 2006; Peters, van Oorsouw, Jelicic, &
Merckelbach, 2013).
Neuropsychologists employ several methods for detecting poor effort,
exaggeration, and malingering. Early on in the push for routine validity testing, Kirkish
and Sreenivasan (1999) proposed two approaches for detection: (1) a qualitative analysis
of test performance that involves comparing the individual’s performance to those with
actual deficits, and (2) the use of specific instruments that are designed to detect feigned
impairment. More recently, the quantitative (i.e., use of measures) approach has been
encouraged to evaluate individual’s effort and response style when conducting
assessments (Iverson & Binder, 2000; Larrabee, 2012). In fact, a major neuropsychology
organization has encouraged the use of assessments designed to evaluate effort and
response style as a way of confirming the validity of the test results (American Academy
of Clinical Neuropsychology Board of Directors, 2007; Heilbronner, Sweet, Morgan,
Larrabee, Millis & conference participants, 2009). Clinicians are encouraged to use more
than one validity measure throughout an examination given that response bias fluctuates
across a testing session. Additionally, it is best practice to base opinions regarding effort
and response style on more than one measure (Boone, 2009; Iverson, 2006; Larrabee,
2012).
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Currently, there are two types of validity tests that are primarily used to evaluate
feigning: performance validity tests (PVTs) and symptom validity tests (SVTs). PVTs are
designed to evaluate the validity of an examinee’s actual ability to perform on a
neuropsychological test and SVTs are designed to evaluate the accuracy of symptoms on
self-report measures (Larrabee, 2012). Thus, PVTs are designed to detect response styles
indicative of feigning on cognitive tests, including inaccurate responses on easy items or
items related to general knowledge and below-chance performance. On the other hand,
SVTs are designed to detect over-exaggeration of symptom severity, over-endorsement
of symptoms, or endorsement of rare or contradictory symptoms; these are response
patterns that are suggestive of feigning. The distinction between PVTs and SVTs is a
relatively recent one that was made by Larrabee (2012) and was supported in a
confirmatory factor analysis conducted by Van Dyke, Millis, Axelrod, and Hanks (2013)
who found distinct factors for cognitive performance tests, PVTs, and self-report
measures (including standard measures and SVTs). Further, a person’s failure on a PVT
does not necessarily imply failure on a SVT; that is, an individual can feign cognitive
deficits, psychiatric symptoms, or both.
In order to understand how neuropsychological validity tests work, the concept of
effort must first be discussed. Schretlen and DeRight (2016) defined effort as exercising
physical or psychological capacities. That is, the clinician should consider if the
examinee is trying hard on a test or just passing some minimal standard on a validity test.
Effort can be thought of as a normal distribution that represents a continuum ranging
from excellent to very poor (Larrabee, 2012; Schretlen & DeRight, 2016). This idea
implies that there are individual differences in how people try on cognitive tests, although

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

11

the mechanism that would explain these differences is unknown. Moreover, about 2.5%
of people will show abnormally low effort on cognitive tests for reasons evaluators can
only make inferences about (Schretlen & DeRight, 2016). Passing a validity test does not
necessarily mean that an examinee put forth his or her best or full effort; rather, it simply
means that they put forth adequate effort (Iverson, 2006). Failing a validity test typically
means that an examinee scored below a certain cut off score, and so their performance is
considered to be invalid and not reflective of their true ability (for PVTs) or symptoms
(for SVTs). If an examinee fails a validity test, it indicates that they were either putting
forth low effort (that is, the examinee is not at all invested) or putting in a large amount
of effort in order to fail the test (i.e., malingering). That is, malingering, which requires
deliberate production or exaggeration of deficits, actually requires a large amount of
effort (Marcopulos, Caillouet, Bailey, Kent, & Frederick, 2014; Schretlen & DeRight,
2016). This result would call into question the validity of all of the defendant’s test
results (Denney & Wynkoop, 2000; Larrabee, 2012). Validity testing is an important step
to take in neuropsychological assessments, because the conclusions that would be made
from test data from a defendant who was putting in suboptimal effort or malingering
would be grossly inaccurate; that is, they would score lower on the tests and thus appear
more impaired than they really are (Larrabee, 2012; Marcopulos et al., 2014). The
effectiveness of validity tests was shown in a meta-analysis that examined 32 studies of
common malingering tests (Vickery, Berry, Inman, Harris, & Orey, 2001); the
researchers found a 95.7% specificity rate across all tests and samples for detecting
feigned responding. Also, the use of routine validity testing is highlighted by the fact that
in a survey of 805 neuropsychologists with some forensic practice, 80.1% reported using
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multiple embedded validity tests in their assessments and 73.5% indicated that they used
multiple stand-alone validity tests (Sweet, Benson, Nelson, & Moberg, 2015). In a similar
survey, 98.7% of 316 neuropsychologists rated the use of validity tests in a forensic
setting as mandatory, and 88.9% agreed or strongly agreed that validity testing provides
more accurate results regarding credibility than clinical impressions and observations
(Martin, Schroeder, & Odland, 2015).
Validity tests have been employed in the detection of malingering in defendants
undergoing CST evaluations (e.g., Green, Rosenfeld, Belfi, Rohlehr, & Pierson, 2012;
Gothard, Vigilione, Meloy, & Sherman, 1995). These measures can be incredibly useful
when assessing defendants, given the obvious secondary gain associated with poor
performance on cognitive tests (Marcopulos et al., 2014). Validity tests are particularly
useful in forensic settings for evaluating the possibility of malingering because they
require minimal effort to reach a passing score (Schretlen & DeRight, 2016). As
discussed previously, there are two main reasons for failing a validity test: low effort and
malingering. When malingering is likely (i.e., when the examinee has some external
incentive to seem impaired, such as legal charges), poor performance on a validity test is
likely due to deliberate production or exaggeration of deficits (Larrabee, 2012).
There is emerging evidence for a more direct approach to feigning incompetence
to stand trial (IST) rather than production or exaggeration of cognitive deficits or
symptoms: feigned lack of knowledge about the legal system. That is, defendants may
not malinger symptoms of psychosis or severe cognitive deficits, but rather fake having
little knowledge of the legal system. Defendants who take this approach may think that
they can show that they have too little knowledge to continue with their legal proceedings
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and be deemed IST because of that lack of knowledge. Recently, an instrument was
developed to address this approach to feigning incompetence: the Inventory of Legal
Knowledge (Musick & Otto, 2010).
1.4 Inventory of Legal Knowledge (ILK)
Two forensic psychologists developed the Inventory of Legal Knowledge (ILK)
to address a need they saw in their own forensic evaluation practices for an assessment
tool that detects feigned lack of legal knowledge in CST evaluations (Musick & Otto,
2010; Otto et al., 2010). The ILK consists of 61 questions about the legal system, all of
which are true or false. See Table 1 for sample items. One point is given for each correct
response, and lower total scores are thought to represent higher levels of feigning. The
ILK was designed to be administered to English-speaking individuals ages 12 and over
who are undergoing CST evaluations. The purpose of the ILK is to help a forensic
evaluator assess a defendant’s response style to questions about the legal system. The test
authors explicitly stated in the test manual that, contrary to the test’s name, the ILK is not
a test of a defendant’s competence or even their legal knowledge. Rather, it is an
instrument designed to assess a defendant’s response style to questions that evaluate his
or her legal knowledge (Otto et al., 2010). Rogers (1984; 2008) identified feigning as a
response style; that is, individuals who are feigning on cognitive tests are likely to
incorrectly answer very easy items or items related to general knowledge, perform poorly
on items across a range of difficulty levels, and perform significantly below chance when
compared to performance of reference groups. Thus, it follows that evaluating a
defendant’s response style might help a forensic evaluator glean information about
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whether the defendant is likely feigning a lack of knowledge about the legal system in
order to appear impaired enough to be deemed IST (Otto et al., 2010).
The ILK is a type of PVT called a forced choice test (FCT). Generally, this
method involves evaluating response styles by presenting an individual with a two
options, one correct and one incorrect. Based on probability theory, an individual is
expected to respond correctly about 50% of the time when only two response options are
presented (Binder & Pankratz, 1987; Frederick & Speed, 2007; Guilmette, Hart, &
Giuliano, 1993; Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989; Otto et al., 2010; Pankratz, Fausti, & Peed,
1975). Poor performance on a FCT does not necessarily mean that an individual is
malingering, given that factors other than intended response style also influence scores on
FCTs (i.e., effort, abilities, and guessing; Frederick & Speed, 2007). However, the idea
behind FCTs is that, at worst, even an individual who is severely impaired and/or lacks
any knowledge of the legal system would be able to perform at chance level (i.e., get
50% correct). There are few other explanations for a score significantly below chance
(i.e., below 50%) other than that the individual is malingering. In fact, Hiscock and
Hiscock (1989) pointed out that in order to obtain a score below 50% on a FCT, the
individual must have the cognitive capacity to also be able to obtain a score significantly
above chance. Frederick and Speed (2007) stated that two factors contribute to below
chance scores: random responding and malingering. Thus, if secondary gain can also be
identified, below chance scores provide strong evidence that the individual deliberately
obtained a low score, presumably to appear more impaired then he or she truly is
(Frederick & Speed, 2007; Guilmette et al., 1993; Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989; Otto et al.,
2010).
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The ILK employs the below-chance method to detect feigned legal knowledge by
presenting defendants with statements related to the legal system. The defendants are
asked to identify if the statement is true or false. Given that there are only two response
options, the probability theory that is the foundation of the below-chance method applies.
That is, defendants are expected to provide correct responses on at least 50% of the items
(i.e., chance level). Other established validity measures employ the below-chance method
(e.g., the Test of Memory Malingering; Tombaugh, 1996), but the items on these
measures are so easy that even a severely impaired person can correctly answer the vast
majority of them. The items on the ILK have not been systematically tested to determine
if they meet this criterion; rather, it seems the test authors simply assumed that the items
would meet the criterion because experts opined that they were written with simple
terminology and sentence structure (Otto et al., 2010; Rogers, Robinson, & Henry, 2015).
The below-chance approach is only one way that the ILK detects possible
feigning. The second way is called the floor effect, which involves comparing
defendants’ scores with average scores from various reference samples, such as criminal
defendants acquitted by reason of insanity or adult inpatients with serious mental
illnesses. The idea is that a defendant is likely feigning if they score significantly below
the average of the appropriate (i.e., most similar) reference group (Flanagan & Jenkins,
2014; Otto et al., 2010). The floor effect approach generally has better sensitivity than the
below-chance approach. This is because the below-chance method only detects extreme
feigning, and typically only identifies about 25% of feigners (Otto et al., 2010).
Reviewers of the ILK have pointed out some of the instrument’s favorable
qualities. Recently, a review was conducted to evaluate the status of the research on CST
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over the last 10 years (Fogel, Schiffman, Mumley, Tillbrook, & Grisso, 2013). In the
review, three new adjudicative competency assessment instruments were discussed,
including the ILK. Fogel and colleagues (2013) mentioned a unique quality about these
new instruments: they were all designed to examine potential feigned IST, which had not
been the focus of any prior measurement tools used by forensic evaluators. Other
reviewers have also highlighted the uniqueness of the ILK, as well as its other positive
attributes. In a Mental Measurement Yearbook review of the ILK, Flanagan and Jenkins
(2014) stated that the ILK seemed to be a useful tool for assessing response styles in
forensic evaluations, given that there is evidence of internal reliability and convergent
validity and that the cut score has adequate sensitivity (ability to correctly detect true
positives; Streiner & Cairney, 2007) and specificity (ability to correctly detect true
negatives; Streiner & Cairney, 2007). Moreover, the ILK is relatively easy to administer
and could easily be used by forensic evaluators during their evaluations of defendants.
The reviewers did, however, caution against using the ILK as the sole method of
assessing response style (Flanagan & Jenkins, 2014).
The ILK has also received some criticism and concerns. In a review of
instruments used in CST evaluations, Acklin (2012) raised the concern that the ILK is a
limited measure in that it focuses solely on feigning a lack of legal knowledge. Moreover,
Acklin (2012) argued that a defendant possessing low levels of legal knowledge does not
necessarily mean that he or she is not competent to proceed in trial. Therefore, the ILK
may not be a very useful instrument for forensic evaluators whose primary concern is
determining if the defendant is competent. These concerns were echoed and elaborated
on by Rubenzer (2011). One issue Rubenzer (2011) had with the ILK was that defendants

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

17

who are going to feign incompetence typically do not feign only a lack of legal
knowledge; rather, they would feign a myriad of deficits (such as cognitive deficits,
psychiatric symptoms, and/or intellectual disability) in an attempt to increase their
chances of avoiding trial. Therefore, the ILK simply may not be a necessary instrument,
as these malingering strategies are able to be detected by existing measures. Rubenzer
(2011) also expressed several concerns with the test development process. He argued that
the ILK showed only moderate ability to detect feigned responses and honest responses
from defendants at the time they are undergoing their competency evaluation, which is
when the ILK would be administered in practice. Rubenzer (2011) also pointed out that
the authors of the ILK did not examine the test’s factor structure; this would have been
important for them to assess so that they can be confident that all items of the test are
measuring the same construct (that is, response style to questions about legal knowledge).
It would only be appropriate to report one total score if the test is, in fact, unidimensional.
He also highlighted the lack of information about how the ILK performs for defendants
with low intelligence levels, which is extremely prevalent in forensic populations for
which the ILK is intended (Rubenzer, 2011). Indeed, research has suggested that
defendants of varying levels of intelligence perform differently on the ILK (Gottfried &
Carbonell, 2014).
There has been some debate regarding the use of the ILK as a validity measure.
Rubenzer (2011) asserted that the ILK may be better as a tool for assessing a defendant’s
level of knowledge about the legal system, rather than for detecting response style.
However, this is the exact opposite purpose for which the test authors intended the ILK
(Otto et al., 2010). This concern was echoed by Rogers and colleagues (2015), who
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pointed out that the individual items have yet to be rigorously tested to determine if they
meet the criteria for the below-chance method (i.e., if they are easy enough that a person
with no legal knowledge could answer a majority of the items). Rubenzer (2011) also
disagreed with the use of the recommended cut score of 47. He argued that it is
completely reasonable for those who are incompetent and/or lack legal knowledge to
score well below 47; in fact, the average for this reference group (n = 17) was 40.59 (SD
= 8.53, range = 29 to 55) and 82% of the sample scored at or below 47 (Otto et al., 2010).
That is, 82% of defendants in the incompetent sample were classified as possible
feigners. However, it is equally possible that these defendants were simply too impaired
or did not have the necessary legal knowledge to correctly answer more than an average
of 47 items. This is quite troubling, as it contradicts the interpretation of the ILK total
score as a measure of likelihood of feigning rather than as a measure of legal knowledge.
In sum, critics of the ILK called for more empirical research on the ILK before
forensic evaluators regularly use it. In general, it has been suggested that all instruments
used in forensic evaluations should have empirical research supporting their reliability
and validity (Fogel et al., 2013; Iverson, 2006; Otto & Heilbrun, 2002; Pirelli et al.,
2011). Selecting assessment tools with sound reliability and validity evidence is vital to
ensuring that the conclusions that are made from the data produced by the instruments are
accurate. In fact, Iverson (2006) argued that it is an ethical violation for clinicians to fail
to use well-researched validity measures. Researchers who have conducted studies
specifically on the ILK have highlighted the importance of determining the validity and
reliability of the ILK prior to its widespread use in CST evaluations, where the stakes are
high for correctly labeling a defendant as competent, incompetent, honest, or feigning

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

19

(Gottfried & Carbonell, 2014; Gottfried Hudson, Vitacco, & Carbonell, 2015; Guenther
& Otto, 2010). Given the paucity of research examining the psychometric properties of
the ILK and debate surrounding its use as a validity test, I attempted to contribute to the
test’s development by exploring its psychometric properties and examining its
performance in a sample of forensically-committed and civilly-committed psychiatric
inpatients.
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CHAPTER TWO
Research Questions
To examine performance of inpatients on the ILK, I evaluated total scores in
relation to reference groups, as well as item-level performance to determine if there were
any items on the test that were particularly difficult for the sample. I also examined
differences in ILK performance in terms of the total score and at the item level between
forensic and civil patients, and competent and incompetent defendants1. The range of
possible scores on the ILK is 0 to 61, with lower scores thought to represent higher levels
of feigning. A score of 47 or below is thought to be suggestive of feigning. Otto and
colleagues (2010) administered the ILK to reference groups consisting of civil patients,
forensic patients, competent defendants, and incompetent defendants. Civil patients
obtained an average total score of 53 and forensic patients obtained an average score of
50 (Otto et al., 2010). Competent defendants correctly answered, on average, 50 of the
items, while incompetent defendants obtained an average total score of 40 (Otto et al.,
2010). I expected to see similar results from the current sample.
I was particularly interested in identifying items that tended to be difficult for the
participants because such items would likely not be effective for discriminating between
feigners and honest responders. That is, even examinees responding honestly would be
likely to incorrectly answer very difficult items. An incorrect answer on difficult items
1

Civil patients are usually those who are committed to the hospital because they are believed to be
dangerous to self or others. Forensic patients are those who are committed to the hospital for legal issues,
typically competency to stand trial restoration treatment and/or to undergo forensic mental health
evaluations. Competent defendants are those who, after a period of competency restoration treatment, are
opined by the forensic evaluator to be competent to stand trial. Incompetent defendants are those who were
opined not to be competent to stand trial, and may undergo additional restoration treatment or be committed
to a long-term psychiatric facility.
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would lower an honest responding examinee’s total score, which may make it seem like
they are feigning a lack of legal knowledge when, in fact, they simply do not know the
answer to the item. This would defeat the purpose of the ILK as a validity test that is
designed to be easy enough that even an impaired person would be able to get many of
the items, if not all, correct. Item 20, which is related to attorney-client confidentiality,
has performed poorly across a range of intelligence levels (Gottfried & Carbonell, 2014),
and so was hypothesized to perform poorly in the current sample. This item may be a
poorly written item, but the researchers did not provide a possible reason for its poor
performance. I took into consideration that on some difficult items, especially those with
many clauses, some feigners may think they were incorrectly responding but actually
correctly answered the item.
I attempted to further the knowledge of the psychometric properties of the ILK in
an inpatient psychiatric sample by examining reliability information. Few studies have
obtained internal reliability measures using an inpatient sample (Gottfried et al., 2015;
Guenther & Otto, 2010; Otto et al., 2010), but the estimates of coefficient alpha have
ranged from .88 (Otto et al., 2010) to .94 (Gottfried et al., 2015). Therefore, I
hypothesized that the internal reliability estimates would fall in that range.
I also evaluated construct validity of the ILK to address the concerns of Rubenzer
(2011) and Rogers and colleagues (2015) regarding the utility of the instrument as a
validity measure that employs the below-chance approach for detecting feigning. This is
a serious issue given that low ILK scores are taken to be indicative of feigning rather than
just a lack of knowledge about the legal system. It could be that, in the current sample,
the instrument functioned more like a test of legal knowledge than a validity measure.
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Preliminary support has been shown for the ILK’s construct validity in terms of it being
able to discriminate between samples asked to simulate feigned incompetence and those
asked to respond honestly (Gottfried et al., 2015; Guenther & Otto, 2010; Otto et al.,
2010; Rogers et al., 2015); however, the dataset used for this study did not contain a
variable that differentiated known feigners and known honest responders. Instead, I
examined performance on the ILK of the entire sample, as well as the four sub-groups:
civil patients, forensic patients, competent defendants, and incompetent defendants.
Forensic patients were used as a proxy for defendants feigning incompetence given that
this group had more of an incentive to feign incompetence than civil patients.
If the ILK functioned as a validity test in the sample, I expected that it would
correlate negatively with a variable representing secondary gain (that is, an external
incentive to feign) associated with legal charges. Similarly, those with legal charges
(forensic patients) were expected to obtain lower ILK total scores than those without
legal charges (civil patients). These findings would suggest that there was a relationship
between likelihood to feign incompetence (indicated by presence of secondary
gain/forensic status) and low ILK score, thus supporting its use as a validity measure. I
expected the range of scores for the entire sample to be condensed above the highest cut
off score that indicates possible feigning (i.e., most participants correctly answered 48 or
more of the items). I expected any participants who scored in the below-chance region to
be forensic patients who have secondary gain in the form of legal charges. In addition,
based on previous research showing that incompetent defendants scored an average of
about 40 on the ILK, I expected defendants declared incompetent to score in the belowchance region. Moreover, the distribution of total scores was expected to differ for
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forensic patients and the entire sample; specifically, more forensic participants than civil
were expected to score at or below 47, which is the highest cut off score indicative of
feigning. Additionally, I attempted to establish if there was convergent validity between
the ILK and the Rey Fifteen Item Test (RFIT), a widely used performance validity
measure. I expected only a moderate correlation such as that found in a prior validity
study by Otto and colleagues (2011; r = .67) due to the fact that the RFIT is a measure of
cognitive effort. RFIT scores for individuals who were feigning psychiatric symptoms
and/or incompetence, but not cognitive deficits, likely would not correlate highly with the
ILK. However, even a moderate correlation between the validity measures would provide
support for interpretation of the ILK as a validity test rather than a test of legal
knowledge.
If, on the other hand, the instrument functioned as a test of legal knowledge in this
sample, I expected that the instrument would have a weak a relationship with secondary
gain, and there would be no significant or practical difference between the average total
score of forensic and civil patients. This would suggest that there was no relationship
between likelihood to feign incompetence and ILK score. In addition, the range of scores
for the entire sample, forensic patients, and civil patients would create a normal
distribution that represents level of legal knowledge as a continuum that ranges from
excellent to poor and varies across the population. Defendants opined to be incompetent
were expected to score on the lower end of the range, while those opined to be competent
were expected to score on the higher end. I also expected the instrument to have a weak
correlation with the RFIT, an established validity measure.
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I was also interested in examining how ILK performance differed between those
defendants declared competent and incompetent. Otto and colleagues (2010) found that
incompetent defendants (M = 40.59, SD = 8.53, range = 29 to 55) had a significantly
lower total ILK score than competent defendants (M = 50.41, SD = 6.85, range = 34 to
60), so I expected a similar result. However, this result might support interpretation of the
ILK as a test of legal knowledge. Incompetent defendants are typically very impaired
and/or lack some fundamental understanding of the nature of legal process, so such a
result would suggest that performance might depend on level of impairment and/or level
of legal knowledge. Thus, a significant difference between incompetent and competent
defendants would suggest that not even those who are very impaired or those with low
levels of legal knowledge can obtain a total score above 47, the highest cut off score that
is suggestive of feigning. This would be problematic because even severely impaired
people can perform very well on most other established validity measures (e.g., Test of
Memory Malingering, Tombaugh, 1996) and it would contradict the test authors’ claim
that the ILK is a validity measure.
There has been no prior research on the nature of the relationship between
demographic, clinical, and legal variables and ILK total score. I was interested in
examining the relationship between ILK total scores and a myriad of clinical and
demographic variables (e.g., age, gender, race, diagnosis, current symptoms, age of
illness onset, duration of illness, and education), as well as legal variables (e.g., prior
history of incarceration, prior offenses). I also attempted to determine if there was a
relationship between performance on a measure of verbal intelligence and performance
on the ILK. This was important to evaluate because it would not be desirable for
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individuals with low intelligence to be classified as possible feigners (i.e., correctly
answer 47 or fewer items) if they are responding to the best of their ability. A prior study
found that intelligence mediated ILK performance in a sample of inpatients (r = .47;
Gottfried & Carbonell, 2014); I expected a similar result.
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CHAPTER THREE
Description of Measurement and Methods
The current study utilized archival data obtained at Western State Hospital, a
psychiatric inpatient hospital located in Staunton, Virginia. The sample contained 17
forensically-committed psychiatric inpatients and 23 civilly-committed psychiatric
inpatients for a total sample of 40 participants. Participants were age 18 and older with a
variety of races, diagnoses, durations of illness, ages of illness onset, and education
levels. Demographic information will be discussed in greater detail in the Results section.
Data were collected between August 9th, 2016 and December 15th, 2016. The
study was approved by the hospital’s Institutional Review Board prior to data collection.
Patients were asked to participate in the study only if they had the capacity to consent to
medical care and if they had been admitted to the hospital within 30 days. That is, the
research team only approached patients who were capable of providing consent for
medical treatment, and by extension, were assumed to be able to provide consent for
participation in a research study.
A board certified clinical neuropsychologist, psychometrician, or trained graduate
student administered the tests to the participants. Participants were offered a consent
form, which they agreed to sign before participating in the study. They did not receive
any direct benefits for participation, such as monetary rewards. The battery included the
ILK, Rey Fifteen Item Test (RFIT), Wide Range Achievement Test-Version 4 (WRAT-4)
word reading subtest, and the Personality Assessment Screener (PAS). The tests were
administered in the following order: RFIT, WRAT, ILK, and PAS. The battery took
approximately half an hour to administer. To obtain demographic information, a research
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team member reviewed patients’ electronic medical records. Demographic information
was then checked and confirmed by another member of the research team. No identifying
information was kept with testing records.
Given that the test data were gathered as part of a clinical research study in order
to determine if the ILK was useful for the population at the hospital, I extended the
project for this thesis by obtaining the competence decisions and legal information for the
forensically-committed patients. I obtained this information for as many participants as
possible by reviewing public records on the official website for the Virginia Judicial
System, contacting court clerks, and contacting the Office of Forensic Services within the
Virginia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services. This information
enabled me to make comparisons between not just forensic and civil participants, but also
between competent and incompetent individuals.
3.1 Inventory of Legal Knowledge (ILK)
There are 61 items on the ILK, all of which are true or false items with content
about various concepts or terms related to the United States criminal justice system.
Specifically, the items are about charges, pleas, defendants’ rights, and roles and
proceedings in the courtroom. See Table 1 for sample items. The test authors’ (Musick &
Otto, 2010) own experiences with conducting CST evaluations and their knowledge of
the criminal justice system informed the construction of the items. They initially came up
with 100 items that were reviewed by a panel of five psychologists, one psychiatrist, two
attorneys, and a clergy member. The 61 items that were selected were believed to have no
gender, race, or ethnic biases. Items were revised to ensure that the language was clear
and succinct. The items have an average reading level of 10th grade or lower, and the
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overall reading level for the ILK is 5th grade. The test authors recommend administering
the ILK only to examinees who have at least a 5th grade reading level. About half of the
items have correct answers of “true” (n = 31), while the other half have correct answers
of “false” (n = 30). The 61 items were also piloted to evaluate how well the ILK
differentiated between feigned and honest responding, and to test the language of the
items. Following the pilot studies, only slight revisions were made to some of the items
(Otto et al., 2010).
An examiner administers the test by reading each item aloud and circling the
examinee’s response (either true or false) on a response sheet. The examiner also
provides feedback to the defendant about whether their response is correct or not. The
test authors allowed for this feedback process to allow defendants who genuinely lack
legal knowledge to learn about the system and potentially improve their performance on
the rest of the test. Moreover, the feedback may encourage defendants who are actually
feigning to perform even worse on the test if they think they are responding correctly too
often. Typically, the ILK takes 15 minutes to administer and can be administered in a
myriad of settings (e.g., jails, psychiatric hospitals, forensic evaluation clinics; Otto et al.,
2010).
One point is given for each correct response and the number of correct responses
is summed to produce a total score, so the range of possible total scores is 0 to 61. As
discussed previously, the ILK employs the below-chance approach to identify feigners.
That is, if a defendant scores below a specified score, it is likely that the defendant is
feigning a lack of legal knowledge. Scores between 37 and 47 are suggestive of feigning,
but are slightly above chance level. Scores between 24 and 36 are considered to be at
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chance level. A score of 23 or lower is considered below-chance responding and thus is
strongly suggestive of a feigned response style (Otto et al., 2010). The test authors also
recommend interpreting ILK total scores in context. That is, a defendant’s score should
be considered not only in reference to below-chance responding, but also to the most
similar reference group (Otto et al., 2010).
3.1.1 Reliability evidence. Otto and colleagues (2010) collected initial internal
reliability evidence when developing the ILK. The control sample consisted of adults,
college students, and adolescents (N = 615). The clinical/forensic sample consisted of
adult psychiatric inpatients, adults declared IST, adults acquitted by reason of insanity,
adult defendants undergoing CST evaluations, juvenile defendants undergoing CST
evaluations, and juveniles declared IST (N = 515). Coefficient alpha for the total score
was .88, which suggests that the ILK has good internal consistency. That is, it is likely
that all items on the test assess the same construct. However, the average item-total
correlation was quite low at .32 (range = .10 to .53) for the adult control sample (n =
211), which indicates that not all of the items were measuring the same construct for this
sample.
Reliability evidence was also collected from samples of psychiatric inpatients (n =
100) and college students (n = 207). Coefficient alpha for college students and psychiatric
inpatients was .66 and .91, respectively. The ILK was administered twice to the college
students within five to 11 days (M = 7.1). The test-retest reliability was adequate at .76
(Guenther & Otto, 2010). Gottfried and colleagues (2015) also obtained reliability
evidence from 195 college students and 130 psychiatric patients who were declared IST.
The college students were asked to either simulate feigned mental illness or lack of legal
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knowledge. Coefficient alpha was high for both groups: .97 for college students and .94
for psychiatric inpatients (Gottfried et al., 2015). Taken together, the findings of these
two studies show initial support for the internal and test-retest reliability of the ILK.
3.1.2 Validity evidence. The ability of the ILK to distinguish feigners and nonfeigners was examined using the control and clinical/forensic groups from which the
initial reliability evidence was derived (Otto et al., 2010). This type of validity evidence
evaluates the degree to which a measure can separate two groups; in the case of the ILK,
the focus is on if it can separate feigners and honest responders. Guenther and Otto
(2010) asked samples of college students and inpatients to respond honestly and feign a
lack of legal knowledge (“fake bad”). College students in the honest condition (M =
55.37, SD = 3.54, range = 45 to 61) obtained significantly higher total scores on the ILK
than those in the fake bad condition (M = 38.46, SD = 8.40, range = 10 to 58) [F(1, 206 =
416.46, p < .001]. Similarly, patients who were asked to respond honestly (M = 55.04, SD
= 7.59, range = 29 to 61) also obtained significantly higher total scores than patients in
the fake bad condition (M = 36.24, SD = 12.75, range = 7 to 57) [F(1, 99 = 64.14, p <
.001]. This finding provides initial support for the ILK being able to distinguish between
feigned and genuine responding (Guenther & Otto, 2010).
Performance of the ILK among jail detainees was also examined by Rogers et al.
(2015) across three versions of the ILK: Total ILK that was comprised of all 61 items, RILK-90 that consisted of 40 items, and R-ILK-95 that was comprised of 28 items. Across
all versions, there were significant differences and large effect sizes between detainees
asked to respond honestly and those asked to feign a lack of legal knowledge. This
provides support for the ILK being able to distinguish between feigned and genuine
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responding, which is what it is designed to do. In a similar study, Gottfried and
colleagues (2015) asked a sample of 195 college students to respond honestly, simulate
symptoms of mental illness, or simulate IST. The participants were evenly distributed
into each group (n = 65). As expected, the honest responders scored higher (M = 55.14,
SD = 4.92, range = 31 to 61) than both those who feigned mental illness (M = 45.29, SD
= 14.03, range = 15 to 59) and those who feigned IST (M = 34.55, SD = 16.08, range = 3
to 60). A sample of 130 psychiatric inpatients was divided evenly into an honest and
suspected feigning group. The honest responders scored significantly higher (M = 53, SD
= 6.56, range = 31 to 61) than the suspected feigners (M = 42.11, SD = 12.02, range = 10
to 61). These results, taken together with those of Rogers and colleagues (2015), provide
further support for the function of the ILK as a measure for detecting feigned responding
when used in controlled, known-groups studies.
The convergent validity of the ILK has also been examined by correlating ILK
scores with scores from other PVT measures (Otto, Musick, & Sherrod, 2011).
Convergent validity, a type of construct validity, refers to the degree to which a test is
designed to measure what it is supposed to measure by correlating scores from the test of
interest with scores from well-established tests of a similar construct. The ILK scores
were moderately correlated with scores from the Rey Fifteen Item Test (r = .67), the
Reliable Digit Span Test (r = .63), and the Test of Memory Malingering Trial 2 (r = .60).
These tests are primarily designed to detect malingering of cognitive and/or memory
deficits, which may explain why the correlations with the ILK, which is designed to
detect feigned lack of legal knowledge, are only moderate. These moderate correlations
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provide some support for the utility of the ILK as a validity measure, rather than a test of
legal knowledge.
3.1.3 Classification accuracy and utility as a validity test. Beyond obtaining
validity evidence, another way that the test authors and other researchers have attempted
to ascertain how the ILK functions in identifying feigners is by examining classification
accuracy statistics. Otto and colleagues (2010) used data from a sample of college
students (n = 207), community psychiatric inpatients (n = 100), and defendants acquitted
by reason of insanity (n = 99). They employed a simulation/known groups design in
which half of each sample was asked to fake bad and the other half was asked to respond
honestly. A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve was used to evaluate the
classification utility of the ILK. A cut score of 47 showed the best specificity and
sensitivity rates across three samples: college student control sample (.84 and .99,
respectively), community psychiatric inpatients (.76 and .82, respectively), and insanity
acquittees (.77 and .77, respectively). Sensitivity refers to the ability of a test to detect
true positives, or if the test can correctly identify people with the disorder of interest as
having the disorder (Larrabee, 2012; Streiner & Cairney, 2007). For example, sensitivity
of the ILK refers to how well the instrument detects defendants who are actually
feigning. Specificity, on the other hand, refers to the ability of a test to correctly identify
true negatives; in other words, if the test can accurately identify a person without the
disorder of interest as not having the disorder (Larrabee, 2012; Streiner & Cairney, 2007).
In the case of the ILK, it refers to the ability of the measure to classify defendants who
are truly responding honestly as not feigning. The ILK currently, on average, has higher
sensitivity than specificity. However, some scholars have suggested that it is acceptable
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for malingering measures to have low sensitivity as long as the test’s specificity is high.
That is, it is acceptable to not detect some malingerers, as long as when a malingerer is
detected, clinicians can be fairly confident that the person is actually malingering
(Reznek, 2005). It could be argued that more focus should be placed on maximizing the
specificity of the ILK.
Across the three groups, the positive predictive power (PPP) ranged from .72 to
.98 and the negative predictive power (NPP) ranged from .77 to .81 (Guenther & Otto,
2010; Otto et al., 2010). PPP and NPP differ from sensitivity and specificity in that they
are proportions. PPP refers to the percentage of individuals who a test accurately
identifies as having the condition of interest; on the other hand, NPP is the percentage of
individuals who the test classifies as not having the condition who truly do not have the
condition of interest (Parikh, Mathai, Parikh, Sekhar, & Thomas, 2008). Thus, the
percentage of individuals correctly classified as malingering ranged from 72% to 98%,
and the percentage of individuals correctly classified as not malingering ranged from
77% to 81%. Area under the curve (AUC) values were also been calculated for three of
the reference samples (Otto et al., 2010). These values represent the probability that
anyone feigning IST will obtain a lower total score than anyone who is not feigning. The
AUC values were large for the college student sample, community psychiatric inpatient
sample, and insanity acquittee sample (.97, .90, and .86, respectively).
More recently, cut scores have been examined in a sample of jail detainees also
with the use of an ROC curve (Rogers et al., 2015). This studied examined three versions
of the ILK: the total ILK that consisted of all 61 items, the R-ILK-90 that consisted of 40
items that 90% of the sample correctly answered, and the R-ILK-95 that consisted of 28
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items that 95% of the sample correctly answered. Using the suggested cut score of 47 that
indicates “suggestive feigning,” the sensitivity and specificity of the Total ILK were .96
and .89, respectively. Also, there was 92% correct classification accuracy. The R-ILK-90
and R-ILK-95 performed well, with classification accuracy rates of 96% using a cut score
of 33 and 99% using a cut score of 25, respectively (Rogers et al., 2015). These results
suggest that shorter versions of the instrument that contain only items that the vast
majority of a given sample correctly answered may perform better than the current
version of the ILK.
The range of ILK total scores can also be used to examine the instrument’s utility
as a validity test. If the ILK is a validity measure, the range of total scores for any sample
should be condensed to above 50% given that, according to the below-chance approach, a
defendant with no legal knowledge should be able to correctly answer about half of the
items. Those who obtain scores below the 50% cut off score should only be individuals
with secondary gain. However, the lowest score for all reference groups was below 47,
the highest recommended cut score. The lowest score for all groups, except the known
malingering group, fell slightly above (range = 37 to 46) or within the range of chance
level (24 to 36; Otto et al., 2010). That is, some people who responded honestly were
considered to be possible feigners; however, these people may have just not known
enough about the legal system to obtain a total score beyond the range indicative of
feigning (> 47). This reiterates the point made by Rubenzer (2011) that it is reasonable
for defendants who are incompetent and/or lack legal knowledge to correctly answer
fewer than 47 of the 61 items. In sum, although the classification accuracy statistics
associated with the ILK in various samples during simulation/known groups designs are
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quite good, they still do not eliminate the possible explanation of a low ILK score as
being indicative of low legal knowledge rather than feigning.
3.1.4 Intelligence and ILK performance. Aside from studies conducted by the
test authors during the test development phase, only three studies have examined the
performance of the ILK in various samples. Gottfried and Carbonell (2014) examined the
relationship between ILK performance and intelligence. The sample consisted of 65
college students and 65 psychiatric inpatients deemed IST. The correlation between total
ILK score and intelligence as measured by the Shipley-2 Vocabulary subtest was .47
across both samples. Among patients, the ILK items most highly correlated with
intelligence were items 12 (r = .44) and 34 (r = .40), which are both related to testifying.
The total ILK score was moderately correlated with intelligence (r = .38) within the
patient sample. Among the student sample, items 45 and 34 were most correlated with
intelligence (r = .40 and .31, respectively). The total ILK score was moderately correlated
with intelligence in the student sample (r = .35).
Gottfried and Carbonell (2014) correlated ILK item and total scores with three
levels of intelligence: extremely low, low average/average, and average/high average.
Interestingly, each level of intelligence was most highly correlated with different ILK
items. In the extremely low group, the highest correlations were with items 7 (r = -.42),
17 (r = .32), and 26 (r = .40). The inverse correlation with item 7 suggests that as
intelligence score increased, performance on the item decreased. Within the low
average/average group, the strongest correlations were with items 1 (r = .33) and 44 (r = .34). Item 44 exhibited an inverse correlation. Within the average/high average group, the
largest correlations were with items 11 (r = .29), 23 (r = .33), 33 (r = .36), and 34 (r =
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.33). Across all the groups, item 20 was answered incorrectly by 41.5% of the
participants, which was significantly more than the percentage of participants who got
any other item incorrect. This may suggest that item 20 is a poorly written item or overly
difficult, but no proposed explanation was offered by the researchers (Gottfried &
Carbonell, 2014).
3.2 Rey Fifteen Item Test (RFIT)
The Rey Fifteen Item Test (RFIT; Rey, 1964) is another PVT designed to detect
malingered memory deficits. It is frequently used in neuropsychological assessments
because it is relatively easy and quick (five minutes) to administer (Nitch, Boone, Wen,
Arnold, & Alfano, 2006). The test is administered by an examiner who presents the
patient with a stimulus card that contains five rows of three stimuli (letters or numbers, a
total of 15 characters) for ten seconds. The range of possible scores is 0 to 15, with lower
scores thought to be more suggestive of malingered memory deficits. The examiner asks
the patient to try to remember as many of the stimuli as possible, and expresses to the
patient that the task is very difficult. In reality, the task is very simple, so simple that even
a severely impaired patient would be able to successfully complete it. Thus, the idea is
that if a patient performs poorly on this task, it raises suspicion that the patient is
exaggerating or faking their memory deficit (Arnett, Hammeke, & Schwartz, 1995; Hays,
Emmons, & Lawson, 1993; Lee, Loring, & Martin, 1992; Love, Glassmire, Zanolini, &
Wolf, 2014; Reznek, 2005; Stimmel, Green, Belfri, & Klavar, 2012). I compared scores
on the RFIT and the ILK to obtain convergent validity evidence for the ILK. Given that
both measures are PVTs, it is reasonable to hypothesize that they will yield similar results
if the individual is taking a cognitive approach to feigning. If the two tests do, in fact,
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provide similar results, it will provide some support for the ILK’s function as a validity
measure.
Several studies have examined the specificity and sensitivity associated with
various cut scores to obtain information about the psychometric properties of the RFIT.
An early study found that the RFIT has low sensitivity (5%) for detecting malingering in
patients who were asked to simulate malingered cognitive deficits (Guilmette, Hart,
Giuliano, & Leininger, 1994). Similarly, another study found poor sensitivity and
adequate specificity for a sample of neurological patients with various conditions.
Specifically, a cut score of fewer than two rows correctly recalled resulted in a sensitivity
of between 47% and 64%, and a specificity of between 64% and 96% across two studies
(Arnett et al., 1995). A meta-review of 13 studies provided more evidence for low
sensitivity and good specificity of the RFIT. Using a cut score of nine, the overall
sensitivity was poor at 36%, but the overall specificity was good at 85% (Reznek, 2005).
A team of researchers added a recognition trial to the administration of the RFIT
after the initial presentation of the stimulus card (Boone, Salazar, Lu, Warner-Chacon, &
Razani, 2002). The recognition trial involves showing the examinee another stimulus
card with several items, 15 of which were the items presented on the prior stimulus sheet.
The examiner asks the examinee to circle the items that were presented on the prior card.
The range of possible combined scores (recall + recognition – false positives) is 0 to 30,
with lower scores thought to be more suggestive of malingered memory deficits. The
addition of this trial has been shown to increase the sensitivity of the test. A combined cut
score of 21 (out of a possible 30) across the recall and recognition trial resulted in a
sensitivity of 70% and a specificity of 92.8% in a sample of forensic patients referred for
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neuropsychological testing (Morse, Douglas-Newman, Mandel, & Swirsky-Sacchetti,
2013). Another study used data from a sample of 116 forensic inpatients undergoing CST
evaluations who were classified by the treatment teams as either malingering or honest.
The use of a recognition trial and a combined cut score of 20 increased the sensitivity of
the RFIT from 44% to 46% with a sample of individuals thought to be feigning (Stimmel
et al., 2012). Taken together, the findings of these studies suggest that the addition of a
recognition trial noticeably increases the sensitivity of the RFIT.
Although the sensitivity of the RFIT is not high unless a recognition trial is added,
overall, the test seems to have similar sensitivity and false positive rates as other tests that
are designed to detect malingering (Nitch et al., 2006). The archival data that were used
for the current study included the recognition trial in the administration of the RFIT so as
to maximize the sensitivity of the instrument.
3.3 Wide Range Achievement Test-4 (WRAT-4) Word Reading Subtest
The Wide Range Achievement Test-4 (WRAT-4; Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006)
is the fourth revision of the WRAT and measures many academic skills: single-word
reading, spelling, sentence comprehension, and math. Of interest to the current study is
the single-word reading subtest. This subtest involves an examiner presenting the patient
with a list of words and asking the patient to read them aloud (Wilkinson & Robertson,
2006). The range of possible scores is 0 to 70, with higher scores indicative of higher
reading ability and better verbal skills. Percentiles by age group and grade-equivalent
scores can also be calculated.
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The WRAT-4 was standardized using a sample of 3,021 individuals ages 5 to 94.
The distribution of gender, race/ethnicity, age, education level, and geographic region
was matched to U.S. Census information. This sample was used to obtain reliability and
validity information for the WRAT-4. Given that the current study only used the singleword reading subtest, only the psychometric properties associated with that subtest will
be discussed. The average internal consistency reliability coefficient for the word reading
subtest across both forms of the WRAT-4 is .92 (Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006), which
indicates high internal reliability (α > .70 is desirable; Cronbach, 1951). This value
indicates that the items on this subtest are highly related and, thus, likely measure the
same construct (i.e., basic reading ability).
In a situation in which the WRAT-4 is administered to the same individual on two
occasions to evaluate an examinee’s change in general functioning over time, it is
necessary to give the second form of the test on the second testing occasion, rather than
the same form. This reduces the likelihood of practice effects impacting the individual’s
score. Thus, it is important to calculate alternate-form re-test reliability coefficients for
the WRAT-4. The average immediate re-test reliability coefficient for the word reading
subtest across all ages of the standardization sample (range = 5 – 94) is .86. The average
delayed re-test reliability coefficient was also calculated for word reading subtest by
administering the two forms of the test to the same individuals (n = 329) approximately
30.7 (SD = 11.5, range = 8 to 86, median = 28) days apart. The resulting coefficient was
.85 across all ages. The mean difference between the scores at the first and second testing
occasion was only 0.50 (Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006). These results suggest that the
WRAT-4 produces consistent scores both when the two forms are administered at the
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same time and when there is a delay between the administrations. To obtain further
validity evidence for the WRAT-4, its subtests were correlated with other instruments
designed to measure similar constructs. The word reading subtest was correlated .71 with
the word reading subtest of the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test II, .66 with the
basic reading subtest of the Woodcock-Johnson III Tests of Achievement, .76 with the
letter/word recognition subtest of the Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement (KTEA)
II, and .75 with the reading subtest of the KTEA Brief Form (Wilkinson & Robertson,
2006). Taken together, these moderate to high correlations suggest that the word reading
subtest of the WRAT-4 measures something similar to reading ability, as it is intended to
do.
Reading is thought to be a relatively stable skill that is not harshly impacted by
brain disease or injury; thus, the word reading subtest is frequently used to measure an
individual’s premorbid verbal intelligence (Caplan, 2011; Johnstone & Wilhelm, 1996).
Several studies have used the WRAT word reading subtest as a measure of premorbid
verbal intelligence with a variety of samples, including those with serious mental
illnesses (i.e., schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, Goldberg et al., 1993; Harvey et al.,
2006; Keefe, Eesley, & Poe, 2005; Kremen et al., 1996), which is particularly relevant to
the current study given that the current sample will contain individuals with serious
mental illnesses. For example, Harvey and colleagues (2006) administered the word
reading subtest of the WRAT-3 to 218 elderly patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.
The patients scored an average of 44.47 (SD = 27.46) at baseline, and an average of 43.05
(SD = 23.03) at the follow-up (six years after baseline). This difference was not
significantly different, t(217) = .54, p = .71, which indicates that WRAT-3 word reading

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

41

scores are stable over time and thus can be used as a measure of premorbid verbal
intelligence (Harvey et al., 2006).
One team of researchers examined the consistency of scores on the WRAT word
reading subtest over time (Johnstone & Wilhelm, 1996). Performance on the subtest was
compared with full-scale intelligence (FSIQ) as measured by the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) for 39 patients who were referred for a secondary
neuropsychological assessment. WRAT word reading subtest scores did not significantly
change for those who showed intellectual decline in terms of FSIQ, t(38) = .56, p < 1.00,
or for those who remained stable (0 to 6 point increase) on FSIQ, t(38) = 1.43, p < .218.
However, scores did significantly improve for those who showed greater than a 6-point
increase on FSIQ, t(38) = 5.82, p < .001. The results suggest that it is appropriate to use
the word reading subtest as a measure of premorbid intelligence for those who decline or
remain stable over time, but not for those who have not yet fully recovered and so may
experience gains in intelligence (Johnstone & Wilhelm, 1996).
Given the results of prior studies and the use of the WRAT word reading subtest
with similar samples to the current sample (i.e., individuals with serious mental illnesses),
I used the WRAT-4 word reading subtest as a measure of premorbid verbal intelligence.
It is unlikely that the sample of psychiatric inpatients experienced large gains in
intelligence that made the WRAT-4 word reading subtest an underestimation of their
premorbid verbal intelligence, given that the patients needed to consent to participate in
the research study and would only have been able to do so if they were recovered fully
enough to have had the capacity to consent. Thus, I explored how performance on the
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ILK varied as a function of verbal intelligence, as measured by the WRAT-4 word
reading subtest.
3.4 Personality Assessment Screener (PAS)
The Personality Assessment Screener (PAS; Morey, 1997) is a 22-item self-report
questionnaire that was extracted from its parent instrument, the Personality Assessment
Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991). It is not a comprehensive instrument, but rather is a brief
measure designed to identify areas that require further assessment. The measure covers
the same 10 domains of emotional and behavioral issues that are covered by the PAI:
Negative Affect (NA), Acting Out (AO), Health Problems (HP), Psychotic Features (PF),
Social Withdrawal (SW), Hostile Control (HC), Suicidal Thinking (ST), Alienation (AN),
Alcohol Problem (AP), and Anger Control (AC). These 10 domains, or factors, were
identified in an analysis of the factor structure of the PAI. The 22 items that make up the
PAS were chosen to equally cover the 10 domains (Morey, 1997). Examinees respond to
each item on a Likert-type scale (“false,” “slightly true,” “mainly true,” “very true”). The
range of possible total scores is 0 to 66, with higher scores representing an increased
likelihood of future self-report assessments identifying significant problems. The range of
possible scores for the NA and AO elements is 0 to 9. The range of possible scores for
the other eight elements is 0 to 6. Probability scores, which indicate the likelihood of
future assessments identifying clinically significant issues, can also be obtained when
scoring the instrument.
Given that the PAS is a self-report measure, responses can be influenced by a
number of factors that may lead to distortion of the results. Although not a full built-in
validity scale, the author of the PAS has identified some ways in which random
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responding, negative impression management, and positive impression management can
be identified (Morey, 1997). Of interest to the current study is the identification of
negative impression management, or malingering. In a research study, college students
were asked to respond to the PAS while pretending to have symptoms of a serious mental
illness. The results showed that the total probability score was extremely elevated (M =
98.55, SD = 7.17, range = 55.11 to 99.98). After conducting an analysis of cut scores,
Morey (1997) recommended a cut score for the total probability score of 99.88 (raw score
of ≥ 46) given that 70% of simulated malingered responses obtained a value this high and
fewer than 5% of patients with genuine symptoms obtained that high of a value.
The instrument was standardized for individuals ages 18 and older. Normative
data were obtained from three samples: a sample of 1,000 community members, a sample
of 1,246 adult patients with a variety of diagnosis from various clinical settings, and a
sample of 1,051 college students. The clinical sample scored higher than the community
sample on all element scores and the total score. Specifically, the clinical sample scored
an average of 25.83 (SD = 9.99), whereas the community sample had an average of 16.66
(SD = 7.40). The sample of college students scored slightly higher on some elements (i.e.,
NA and AO) than the community sample, but there was less variability across the scores.
The mean total PAS score for the college student sample was 17.55 (SD = 6.89; Morey,
1997).
The PAS has been shown to have desirable psychometric properties. Internal
consistency reliability for the PAS total score for the community, clinical, and student
sample was .75, .79, and .72, respectively. These values are adequate (α > .70 is
desirable; Cronbach, 1951). Test re-test reliability was also obtained for the community
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and college student sample. There were 24 days, on average, between testing occasions
for the community sample, and 28 for the college student sample. Test re-test reliability
was adequate for both the community and student sample at .87 and .85, respectively
(Morey, 1997). Validity information was also obtained for the PAS by correlating its total
score and element scores from the three samples with scores on other measures of related
constructs. For example, the NA subscale was moderately correlated with the Depression
subscale of the MMPI (r = .53) and the PAI Depression subscale (r = .62). Similarly, the
SW subscale was correlated moderately with the Social Introversion subscale of the
MMPI (r = .59). These correlations provide some evidence that the PAS subscales
measure the construct they are intended to measure. The average scaled scores of various
clinical groups was also compared to gain validity evidence. For example, individuals
diagnosed with schizophrenia scored higher than other clinical groups on the PF subscale
(M = 64.2), while individuals diagnosed with alcohol abuse/dependence scored very high
on the AP subscale (M = 82.9; Morey, 1997). This information provides further support
for the PAS as a screening tool that can be used to detect areas indicative of a clinical
issue.
The PAI has been used with samples similar to that of the current study, namely
psychiatric inpatients admitted for clinical treatment (Bell-Pringle, Pate, & Brown, 1997;
Boone, 1998), forensic psychiatric inpatients (Douglas, Hart, & Kropp, 2001; Rogers,
Gillard, Wooley, & Ross, 2011), and various forensic and correctional facility samples
(Boccaccini, Murrie, & Duncan, 2006; Edens, Cruise, Buffington-Vollum, 2001; Morey
& Quigley, 2002; Rogers, Ustad, & Salekin, 1998). Given that the PAI has been used
with these samples, it follows that the PAS would also have utility in these samples.
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However, few studies have examined its use with such samples. Christensen, Girard,
Benjamin, and Vidailhet (2006) employed the PAS to gain symptom information from 28
patients with schizophrenia during a study of mnemonic abilities. They found that healthy
controls and patients diagnosed with schizophrenia obtained significantly different total
scores on the PAS, t(27) = 3.38, p = .001. Specifically, patients obtained a more impaired
score (M = 17.38, SD = 7.38), on average, than healthy controls (M = 11.22, SD = 5.56).
They concluded that the PAS can therefore be used as a screening measure for the
detection of schizophrenia. Harrison and Rogers (2007) administered the PAS to 100 jail
detainees along with a battery of other assessments. The NA scale was useful as a
screening measure for depression with a correct classification rate of 80%.
The majority of the research on the PAS has been conducted using other samples,
such as low-income urban women (Porcerelli, Kurtz, Cogan, Markova, & Mickens, 2012)
and college students (Kelley, Edens, & Morey, 2016). In a study of 100 low-income
urban women, Porcerelli and colleagues (2012) determined that the PAS was a useful
screening tool for mood disorders, cluster B personality disorders, and alcohol use
disorders given that PAS scales were moderately correlated with other measures of
related constructs (e.g., the AP element was correlated .40 with the Alcohol Use
Disorders Test). Kelley and colleagues (2016) obtained convergent validity evidence for
the PAS by correlating PAS self-reports of college students and informant reports
(obtained from the students’ roommates) as measured by the PAS-Other. The PAS-Other
is completed by someone other than the individual of interest who can answer questions
about the individual’s behaviors and emotions. The reports were moderately related, r =
.45, p < .01.
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Given the body of validity evidence for the PAS, I attempted to determine the
relationship between ILK performance and performance on both the overall PAS and
scores from its subscales. That is, I was interested in using the PAS as a measure of
clinical presentation, and examining the nature of the relationship between clinical
presentation/symptoms and ILK performance. I also looked for particularly high total
scores on the PAS that may have indicated possible feigning, as discussed previously.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Description of Data Analysis
A variety of analyses were used to explore the psychometric properties of the
scores from the ILK and the performance of the sample on the test. All analyses were
conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics version 23.0 (IBM Corp, 2015). Only scores on the
ILK from participants who had a 5th grade reading level or higher as measured by the
WRAT-4 reading subtest were included in most analyses. Analyses of data from all
participants, regardless of reading level, will be noted. Descriptive statistics (means,
standard deviations, and frequencies) were computed for the test scores and various
demographic and historical variables including age at time of testing, gender, race,
diagnosis, age of illness onset, duration of illness, education level, and psychiatric
history. Information about present legal charges was also obtained for the forensic
sample.
To evaluate how the sample of inpatients performed on the ILK, I examined
average total scores and conducted an item analysis for the entire sample, as well as for
each group (forensic participants, civil participants, competent defendants, and
incompetent defendants). Item analysis involves examining performance on a test at the
item-level, which can be useful for assessing problems with the overall instrument
(Ferketich, 1991). Evaluating differences in item-level performance between forensic and
civil patients was done to provide some insight into how performance of a group more
likely to feign incompetence (i.e., forensic participants) compared to a group with less
incentive to engage in this type of feigning (i.e., civil participants). The item analysis
included an examination of the response patterns for each participant to determine if there
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was a particular way in which forensic and civil patients tend to respond to the items.
Item discrimination aided in identifying items that best discriminated between forensic
and civil patients, as these items should be best able to differentiate between feigners and
honest responders. Item discrimination was calculated by comparing the ratio of the
proportion of those who correctly answered the item in the forensic group to the
proportion of those who correctly answered the item in the civil group (i.e., the relative
risk ratio). I evaluated if there were any ratios that indicated a large discrepancy between
the forensic and civil groups, specifically looking for items that forensic participants
tended to answer incorrectly and that civil patients tended to answer correctly.
Additionally, I conducted similar comparisons of the competent and incompetent
defendants to ascertain if performance was related to competence-related abilities/level of
legal knowledge.
I examined the item difficulty of each of the 61 items to determine if there were
particular items that many participants (25% or more) answered incorrectly (i.e., the item
is too difficult for this sample). A cut off score of 25% was selected to be comparable to
prior cut scores of 5% and 10% that were used with a sample of nearly 100 participants
(Rogers et al., 2015). That is, prior researchers identified items that five to 10 participants
incorrectly answered, and a cut score equal to 10 participants out of the total sample (i.e.,
25% of 40) was selected for this study. In the context of the ILK, a difficult item would
be one that even those responding honestly tend to get incorrect. As discussed previously,
identification of these items is important because they are unlikely to be effective for
differentiating feigned and honest responding. I also examined the wording and content
area of the items, item difficulty indices, corrected item total correlation, coefficient-
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alpha-if-item-deleted, and the inter-item correlations. Item difficulty indices were
calculated by obtaining the proportion of respondents who answered the item correctly.
The corrected item-total correlation is an indication of how related a particular item is to
the rest of the test. The item is essentially correlated with the total score of the test;
corrected item-total correlations do not include the score on the item in the total score so
as to not inflate the correlation. Ideally, for a theoretically one-dimensional test like the
ILK, each item should be highly related to the entire test. Similarly, the value of the
coefficient-alpha-if-item-deleted should remain the same or decrease, as that would
indicate that the addition of the item does not decrease the reliability of the test and is
thus a “good” item. The inter-item correlations among the ILK items should theoretically
be high, given that the test authors designed the ILK to measure one construct. If a
particular item is not highly correlated with other items on a given measure, then that
item may be measuring a different construct than the other items on the instrument
(Ferketich, 1991).
I obtained reliability evidence for the ILK in the form of coefficient alpha.
Coefficient alpha is a measure of the consistency of the items on a test (Cronbach, 1951).
That is, it indicates how related the items are to each other. Obtaining an estimate of
internal reliability is especially important for tests that are assumed to measure one
construct. If this assumption is true, it is valid to report one score as a representation of
performance on the entire test. However, if this assumption is false, it would be more
accurate to report subscale scores. For a test like the ILK, which was designed to measure
one construct (i.e., response style to questions about a defendant’s legal knowledge), a
measure of internal consistency is expected to reflect the inter-relatedness of the items. It
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is important to note that a high internal reliability estimate is not necessarily an indication
that the test is unidimensional; rather, it only indicates that the items are related (Green,
Lissitz, & Mulaik, 1977).
I conducted a set of analyses to evaluate the construct validity of the instrument in
order to determine if the ILK functioned as a validity measure or as a test of legal
knowledge. Prior studies have responded to this issue by conducting simulation studies in
which ILK performance is compared between a group asked to respond honestly and a
group asked to “fake bad,” or pretend to feign incompetence (Gottfried et al., 2015;
Guenther & Otto, 2010; Otto et al., 2010; Rogers et al., 2015). Such studies diminish the
possibility of the alternative explanation of a low ILK score being indicative of a lack of
legal knowledge, rather than feigning, due to the controlled nature and random
assignment of group membership. These studies have found fairly good support for the
utility of the ILK as a measure to detect feigning. The simulation approach was not
possible given the archival nature of the present study; however, I used other statistical
methods to attempt to determine how the ILK performed as a validity measure in the
current sample. Following data collection, I created a variable identifying if a participant
was a forensic or civil patient. This variable was then correlated with ILK scores to see if
presence of an external incentive to feign incompetence (legal charges for this sample)
was associated with poor performance on the ILK. Similarly, to evaluate if the ILK could
differentiate those more likely to be feigners of incompetence and those more likely to be
honest responders, an independent t-test was conducted to compare the ILK scores of
forensic and civil patients. An independent t-test was also used to evaluate the ILK scores
of competent and incompetent defendants to determine if there was an indirect
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relationship between competence-related abilities/level of legal knowledge and
performance on the ILK. Due to the small sample size, I also focused on inspecting the
raw mean differences and effect sizes to evaluate the differences between these groups,
rather than relying solely on the results of the significance tests. Cohen’s d, a measure of
the standardized difference between two means, was calculated as the effect size (Cohen,
1992). To further probe significant mean differences, I conducted regression analyses to
control for variables such as education and duration of illness.
The range and distribution of scores was also examined for the entire sample,
forensic participants only, and civil participants only to determine if the scores were
restricted above the highest cut score (as would occur for a validity test) or created a
normal distribution (which would suggest that the ILK is closer to a test of legal
knowledge than a test of response style). I identified the forensic or civil status of any
participants who obtain score of 47 or below.
One way to obtain construct validity evidence is by examining a test’s
relationship with other tests. Ideally, tests that measure the same construct should be
highly correlated. This is known as convergent validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).
Convergent validity evidence would lend information about construct validity, or if the
ILK actually detects feigning as it was developed to do. This was obtained for the current
study by correlating ILK total scores with RFIT combination scores. I also determined if
any participants were classified as potential feigners on both tests. Due to the fact that the
RFIT is a memory test and a measure of cognitive effort, I expected only a moderate
correlation between it and the ILK; that is, RFIT scores for individuals who were
feigning psychiatric symptoms but not cognitive deficits were not expected to correlate
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highly with the ILK. However, even a moderate correlation with the RFIT would support
the interpretation of the ILK as a validity measure, rather than a test of legal knowledge. I
determined if any participants who obtained a total probability score of 99.88 or greater
(raw score of ≥ 46) on the PAS were also classified as possibly feigning on the RFIT or
the ILK. I also correlated ILK total scores with PAS total probability scores. Similar to
the RFIT, I expected only a moderate correlation between the ILK and PAS given that the
PAS is used to evaluate symptom validity.
To evaluate the relationship between ILK total scores and demographic, clinical,
and legal variables, I obtained correlations between those variables and the total test
score. I determined the relationship between the ILK scores and premorbid verbal
intelligence by obtaining correlations between ILK total scores and item scores and
WRAT-4 word reading standardized scores. Similarly, I examined the relationship
between clinical symptoms and ILK performance by correlating the ILK total scores and
PAS total standardized scores, and ILK total scores with PAS standardized element
scores.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Results
Participants (N = 40) were individuals admitted to a southeastern state psychiatric
hospital. There were 22 individuals admitted for civil commitment, 12 admitted to be
evaluated for adjudicative competence, five admitted for pre-trial treatment, and one
admitted for post-sentence treatment. Participants admitted for pre-trial treatment were
included in the forensic group, which also included those admitted for a CST evaluation,
given that they have secondary gain in the form of delaying their legal proceedings2. The
one participant who was admitted for post-sentence treatment was included in the civillycommitted group due to lack of secondary gain (i.e., no incentive to feign
incompetence)3. Thus, there were 17 forensically-committed patients and 23 civillycommitted patients in the sample. Of the 12 defendants admitted for a CST evaluation,
eight were opined by a forensic evaluator to be competent to stand trial and four were
opined incompetent but restorable4. The court agreed with the opinion of the forensic
evaluator on 100% of cases for which I could obtain information regarding the court’s
decision regarding trial competence (n = 5)5.
The majority of the participants were male (75%). Age ranged from 18 to 62 (M =
36.73, SD = 13.79). Of the participants, 57.5% were Caucasian, 22.5% were African
2

These defendants did not significantly differ from those admitted for a CST evaluation in terms of
relevant demographic characteristics or test performance.
3
The test scores of the defendant admitted for post-sentence treatment were not more than one standard
deviation away from the mean of the civilly-committed group. Similarly, the defendant’s demographic
characteristics were within the range of the civilly-committed groups’ characteristics.
4
This group of defendants will be referred to as incompetent for the purposes of the current study.
5
Final information regarding the court’s finding of competence was obtained for five of the 12 defendants
admitted for an evaluation of trial competence. Information was not obtained for the other seven defendants
either because the court’s final decision regarding competence was unclear (e.g., the case was nolle
prosequi or dismissed; n = 4) or final disposition information was not available by April 1, 2017 (n = 3).
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American, 2.5% were Asian, and 17.5% were another race (e.g., biracial or mixed race).
Participants were diagnosed mostly with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (50%), bipolar
disorder (27.5%), and/or substance use disorders (42.5%). Onset of illness ranged from
nine to 51 years old (M = 20.06, SD = 10.46) and duration ranged from less than one year
to 47 years (M = 15.46, SD = 11.28). Additionally, two participants were assumed to
have lifetime issues due to intellectual disability. Seventy-five percent of the participants
had some prior non-psychiatric medical history (e.g., history of seizures, asthma, and
hyperthyroidism). The vast majority of the sample had previously been admitted to an
inpatient psychiatric hospital (90%) and/or had been prescribed psychiatric medications
(90%). Education level ranged from 6 to 18 years (M = 12.33, SD = 1.99). Thirty percent
of participants had experience with special education. The majority of the participants
were currently unemployed (72.5%) or on disability (25%). Most of the participants had
never been married (67.5%) or were divorced (25%). See Table 2 for complete
demographic information and Table 3 for legal information of the forensic sample.
Thirty-nine participants completed the RFIT; the average combination score was
23.28 (SD = 7.20, range = 4 to 30). The range of possible combination scores was 0 to
30. There were 37 participants who completed the WRAT-4 word reading subtest. The
average standard score was 88.95 (SD = 10.98, range = 66 to 113). On average,
participants scored at a 9th grade reading level (M = 9.64, SD = 2.97, range = 3.10 to
12.90). The average total probability score on the PAS was 74.42 (SD = 31.75, range =
1.31 to 99.58) for 32 participants who had complete data on the test. This indicates that,
on average, participants in this sample were at a moderate risk for potential clinically
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significant emotional and/or behavioral problems. See Table 4 for complete information
on test performance.
5.1 Performance on the ILK
There were 32 participants who completed the ILK who also had the appropriate
reading level as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading subtest (≥ 5th grade). The
average total score on the ILK was 55.03 (SD = 4.83, range = 40 to 61), which is above
the highest cut score used to indicate possible feigning (i.e., 47). Three participants
obtained a total score lower than 47; all of which were civil participants. The average
cumulative percentile using the combined clinical adult reference sample was 63.94 (SD
= 24.84, range = 10 to 99). Four participants took the ILK but had a reading level lower
than 5th grade; all of these participants had a diagnosis of intellectual disability and
scored below 47 on the ILK (range = 28 to 43).
An item analysis was conducted to evaluate the pattern of responses of the 32
participants who completed the ILK. Participants tended to answer “true” rather than
“false” on all items. On average, participants answered “true” to 55 items and “false” to
11 items. Of the 32 participants who completed the ILK, an average of 29 participants
answered “true” and only three answered “false” to an item. There were 13 of the 61
items that all participants correctly answered: 4, 6, 10, 19, 26, 27, 28, 30, 37, 40, 48, 52,
and 53. Although there were no obvious overarching themes in the content of these items,
the majority of the statements tended to be shorter than other items on the test and only
contained one clause. Ten of these items had a correct answer of “true,” and the other
three had a correct answer of “false.” There were also several items that appeared to be
difficult for the sample. Specifically, 25% or more of the sample (i.e., eight or more
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participants) incorrectly answered items 20 (37.5%), 25 (28.1%), 43 (40.6%), 44
(37.5%), 46 (34.4%), and 59 (25.0%). These items tended to be long in length and two
contained more than one clause. All but one of these items had a correct answer of
“false.” The three participants who scored less than 47 on the ILK incorrectly answered
these items, with the exception of items 44 and 59. One of the three participants correctly
answered each of those items. The corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-itemdeleted values were also examined (see Table 5). The mean inter-item correlation was
very low at .079 (range = -.293 to 1.00). Corrected item-total correlations lower than .079
may represent a problem with the item. Items that had a low corrected item-total
correlation were 15 (r = .008), 17 (r = .031), 24 (r = .032), 38 (r = -.111), 44 (r = .053),
57 (r = .002), 58 (r = -.035), and 60 (r = .053).
5.1.1 Forensically- and civilly-committed participants. There were 13 forensic
participants who completed the ILK who also had the appropriate reading level as
measured by the WRAT-4 word reading subtest (≥ 5th grade). The average ILK total
score was 57.23 (SD = 2.98, range = 51 to 61), and no forensic participants obtained a
total score lower than the highest cut score used to identify feigning (i.e., 47). The
average cumulative percentile using the combined clinical adult reference sample was
75.00 (SD = 20.34, range = 38 to 99). There were 19 civil participants who completed the
ILK who also had the appropriate reading level as measured by the WRAT-4 word
reading subtest (≥ 5th grade). The average total score on the ILK was 53.53 (SD = 5.33,
range = 40 to 59). Three civil participants had a total score lower than 47. The average
cumulative percentile using the combined clinical adult reference sample was 56.37 (SD
= 25.26, range = 10 to 91). The mean difference between forensic and civil patients on
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the ILK total score was statistically significant, t(30) = -2.27, p = .031, d = .82, with
forensic participants obtaining higher average total scores than civil participants. The
mean difference was practically significant, given that the effect size was large according
to standards for Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1992). There were no meaningful differences in
response patterns across the two groups.
Further analyses were conducted to understand the mean difference between
forensic and civil patients on the ILK. Separate multiple regression analyses were done to
determine if forensic and civil patients differed on the ILK when controlling for
education, WRAT-4 word reading standard scores, types of diagnoses, prior offenses,
prior incarceration, duration of illness, and onset of illness. These variables were chosen
because they could reasonably account for the mean difference between the groups (e.g.,
higher education, prior experience with the legal system, illness severity). These models
were the equivalent of an analysis of covariance, each with only one covariate. In each
regression model, one of these variables was entered in as a predictor variable/covariate.
Forensic status was also entered into each model as a predictor variable. The dependent
variable used for all models was ILK total scores. Interactions were included to check the
assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes; there were no statistically significant
interactions between forensic status and the covariates. When controlling for education,
forensic status (b = 3.56, p = .039, sr2 = .366) significantly predicted ILK scores. When
controlling for WRAT-4 word reading subtest standard score, forensic status (b = 3.63, p
= .023, sr2 = .375) significantly predicted ILK scores. When controlling for
neurodevelopmental disorder, forensic status (b = 3.75, p = .031, sr2 = .387) significantly
predicted ILK scores. When controlling for schizophrenia spectrum disorder, forensic
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status (b = 3.61, p = .042, sr2 = .364) significantly predicted ILK scores. When
controlling for trauma disorder, forensic status (b = 3.70, p = .033, sr2 = .382)
significantly predicted ILK scores. Finally, when controlling for substance use disorder,
forensic status (b = 3.99, p = .021, sr2 = .408) significantly predicted ILK scores.
Forensic status was not a significant predictor when included in a model containing prior
offenses, prior incarceration, duration of illness, onset of illness, or presence of an
anxiety disorder, personality disorder, or intellectual disability. One participant, who was
forensically-committed, had a diagnosis of an anxiety disorder. Similarly, one participant
had a diagnosis of intellectual disability and was a forensic participant. There were six
participants with a diagnosis of a personality disorder, five of which were civil
participants.
Item discrimination was calculated by dividing the percentage of correct
responses from forensic participants by the percentage of correct responses from civil
participants. See Table 6 for item discrimination statistics. Ratios greater than 1 indicated
that forensic participants had a higher percentage of correct responses and ratios less than
1 indicated that civil participants had a higher percentage of correct responses. Ratios
equal to 1 indicate that forensic and civil patients had the same percentage of correct
responses. There were 39 items on which forensic participants had a higher percentage of
correct responses (1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36,
38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, and 61), and nine items
on which civil participants had a higher percentage (7, 11, 18, 22, 25, 29, 34, 58, and 59).
Item 44, which is about the different pleas a defendant can enter, had the largest
discrepancy in correct responses from forensic and civil participants, with nearly all
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(92.3%) of the forensic participants correctly answering the item and less than half
(42.1%) of civil participants correctly answering it. Similarly, item 46, which is about
responsibilities of the defense attorney, was correctly answered by 92.3% of forensic
participants and only 47.4% of civil participants. The majority of the items on which the
civil participants had a higher percentage of correct responses were related to the role of
the defendant in legal proceedings. All participants correctly answered the remaining 13
items.
An item analysis was conducted to evaluate the pattern of responses of the 13
forensic participants who completed the ILK. The entire group correctly answered the
majority of the items on the ILK. That is, there were 34 items that all participants in this
group correctly answered: 3, 4, 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31,
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, and 61. There were also items
that appeared to be difficult for the sample. Specifically, 25% or more of the sample (i.e.,
four or more participants; 30.8%) incorrectly answered items 20 (30.8%), 25 (30.8%), 43
(30.8%), and 59 (30.8%). These incorrect responses were not from the same four
participants. As previously mentioned, these items tended to be longer, have more than
one clause, and have a correct answer of “false.” The average inter-item correlation was
.071 (range = -.365 to 1.00). Items that had a corrected item-total correlation lower than
.071 were 1 (r = .031), 8 (r = -.091), 9 (r = -.017), 34 (r = -.039), 44 (r = -.362), 46 (r =
.031), 49 (r = -.070), 59 (r = .069), and 60 (r = -.070). See Table 7 for all corrected itemtotal correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values for the forensic participants.
Another item analysis was done to examine the performance of the 19 civil
participants who completed the ILK. There were 15 items that all participants in this
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group correctly answered: 4, 6, 10, 18, 19, 26, 27, 28, 30, 37, 40, 48, 52, 53, and 58.
Twenty-five percent or more of the sample (i.e., five or more participants; 26.3%)
incorrectly answered items 20 (42.1%), 25 (26.3%), 42 (26.3%), 43 (47.4%), 44 (57.9%),
46 (52.6%), and 55 (26.3%). Again, these items tended to be longer in length, contain
more than once clause, and have a correct answer of “false.” The average inter-item
correlation was .086 (range = -.606 to 1.00). Items that had a corrected item-total
correlation lower than .086 were 13 (r = .072), 15 (r = -.109), 17 (r = -.082), 21 (r =
.072), 22 (r = .072), 24 (r = -.057), 33 (r = .042), 38 (r = -.199), 42 (r = .045), 44 (r = .099), 54 (r = -.001), 57 (r = -.064), and 60 (r = .029). See Table 8 for all corrected itemtotal correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values for the civil participants.
5.1.2 Competent and incompetent defendants. There were seven defendants
opined to be competent by a forensic evaluator who completed the ILK and also had the
appropriate reading level as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading subtest (≥ 5th grade).
The average total score was 57.00 (SD = 3.51, range = 51 to 61). The average cumulative
percentile using the combined clinical adult reference sample was 74.00 (SD = 22.46,
range = 38 to 99). There were three defendants opined to be incompetent but restorable
by a forensic evaluator who completed the ILK who also had the appropriate reading
level as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading subtest (≥ 5th grade). The average total
score was 58.33 (SD = 3.06, range = 55 to 61). The average cumulative percentile using
the combined clinical adult reference sample was 82.00 (SD = 22.87, range = 56 to 99).
The mean difference between competent and incompetent defendants on the ILK total
score was not statistically significantly different, t(8) = .568, p = .586, d = .39, with a

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

61

small practical significance according to standards for Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1992). There
were no meaningful differences in the pattern of responses across the two groups.
Item discrimination was calculated by dividing the percentage of correct
responses from competent defendants by the percentage of correct responses from
incompetent defendants. See Table 6 for item discrimination statistics. Ratios greater
than 1 indicated that competent defendants had a higher percentage of correct responses
and ratios less than 1 indicated that civil participants had a higher percentage of correct
responses. Ratios equal to 1 indicate that competent and incompetent defendants had the
same percentage of correct responses. There were six items on which competent
defendants had a higher percentage of correct responses (2, 7, 11, 29, 34, and 43), and 16
items on which incompetent participants had a higher percentage (8, 9, 14, 18, 20, 22, 25,
32, 33, 41, 42, 44, 49, 56, 59, and 60). All participants correctly answered the remaining
39 items.
The performance of the seven defendants opined to be CST by an evaluator was
examined with an item analysis. There were 41 items that all participants in this group
correctly answered: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, and 61.
Twenty-five percent or more of the sample (i.e., two or more participants; 28.6%)
incorrectly answered items 8 (28.6%), 20 (57.1%), 25 (42.9%), 42 (28.6%), and 59
(28.6%). These items tended to be longer in length, contain more than once clause, and
have a correct answer of “false.” The average inter-item correlation was .132 (range = .548 to 1.00). Items that had a corrected item-total correlation lower than .132 were 8 (r =
-.138), 9 (r = -.107), 34 (r = -.348), 44 (r = -.463), 49 (r = -.107), and 60 (r = -.107). See
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Table 9 for all corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values for the
competent defendants.
Another item analysis was conducted to evaluate the response patterns of the three
defendants opined to be incompetent by a forensic evaluator. All three correctly answered
all 61 items on the ILK except for items 2, 7, 11, 29, 34, and 43. Two out of three
(66.7%) of the incompetent defendants incorrectly answered items 11 (66.7%) and 43
(66.7%)6. These items had to do with a “not guilty” plea. The average inter-item
correlation was .733 (range = .50 to 1.00). Items that had a corrected item-total
correlation lower than .733 were 11 (r = .655) and 43 (r = .655). See Table 10 for all
corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values for the incompetent
defendants.
5.2 Reliability and Validity of the ILK
5.2.1 Reliability. The internal consistency reliability estimate for the ILK when
including the total sample was .806, which is desirable according to standards for
Cronbach’s alpha (α > .70; Cronbach, 1951). The reliability estimate was lower when
including only the forensic participants (n = 13, α = .652) and competent defendants (n =
7, α = .760). When including only the civil participants (n = 19), the reliability estimate
was .810, and was .943 for incompetent defendants only (n = 3). When excluding the six
difficult items (items 20, 25, 43, 44, 46, and 59), the alpha coefficients changed as
follows: total (α = .765), forensic (α = .657), civil (α = .760), competent (α = .743),
incompetent (α = .952).

6

Although 25% was the proportion selected for the other subgroups to identify difficult items, a larger
proportion (2 out of 3, 66.7%) was selected for this group due to the small sample size (n = 3).
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5.2.2 Validity. There was a significant correlation between ILK total score and
presence of secondary gain (r = .383, p = .031). The relationship was positive and of
moderate strength. That is, presence of secondary gain was associated with higher ILK
total scores. Presence of secondary gain was conflated with having a forensic status; thus,
those with legal charges obtained higher scores on the ILK than those without. Along
those lines, there was a statistically and practically significant difference between the
average ILK total scores of forensic and civil participants, t(30) = -2.27, p = .031, d = .82.
The average ILK total score of forensic participants was 57.23 (SD = 2.98, range = 51 to
61), and was 53.53 (SD = 5.33, range = 40 to 59) for civil participants. Forensic
participants answered an average of four more questions correctly than civil participants.
There was not a statistically or practically significant difference between the average ILK
total scores of competent and incompetent defendants, t(8) = .568, p = .586, d = .39.
Incompetent defendants (M = 58.33, SD = 3.06, range = 55 to 61) answered an average
of one more question correctly than competent defendants (M = 57.00, SD = 3.51, range
= 51 to 61).
To obtain convergent validity evidence, ILK total scores were correlated with
RFIT combination scores. The relationship between ILK scores and RFIT combination
scores was not significant, but was significant for the RFIT recall scores (r = .371, p =
.036). Five participants were classified as possible feigners using the RFIT combination
scores (scores < 20). Three of these participants were forensic, and two were civil. Two
participants were classified as potentially feigning using the RFIT recall scores (scores <
9); these participants also scored below the cut off on the combination scores. One of
these two participants was forensic, and the other was civil. None of the participants who
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scored below expectation on the RFIT also scored below the highest cut score on the
ILK. That is, no participants were classified as possibly feigning by both performance
validity measures. ILK total scores were also not correlated with PAS total probability
scores. Six participants were classified as possible feigners using the PAS cut score of
99.88; none of these participants were classified as feigning on the ILK. Three of these
participants were forensic, and three were civil. Although there was not a significant
correlation between the PAS total probability score and either of the RFIT scores, some
participants were classified as possible feigners on both of these measures. Of the six
participants classified as feigning on the PAS, two of the forensic participants and one of
the civil participants scored below expectation on RFIT combination. One of these
forensic participants and one of these civil participants also scored below expectation on
RFIT recall.
The range of total scores on the ILK was also examined for validity evidence (see
Figure 1). The range of scores for the total sample was 40 to 61. Forensic participants’
scores ranged from 51 to 61, and civil participants’ scores ranged from 40 to 59. The
highest cut score on the ILK that is indicative of possible feigning is 47. Thus, only
civilly-committed participants were classified as potential feigners. There were three civil
participants who scored below 47; their total scores were 40, 45, and 46. Two of these
participants also did poorly on the RFIT (combination scores of 20 and 21). These
participants were not classified as possibly feigning by the PAS. Additionally, two had
reading levels as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading subtest (5.8 and 8.6) that were
lower than the total sample’s mean reading level (M = 9.64, SD = 2.97). These
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participants did not share a common diagnosis. All three participants had no history of
incarceration.
5.3 ILK Performance in Relation to Other Variables
There was a significant relationship between performance on the ILK and the
estimate for pre-morbid verbal intelligence as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading
subtest (r = .387, p = .029). The relationship was positive and moderate; this suggests that
higher verbal intelligence was associated with higher ILK scores. The relationship
between ILK and WRAT-4 word reading subtest scores was not significant for forensic
participants, but was significant for civil participants (r = .541, p = .017) with a slightly
stronger, positive relationship than that of the total sample. WRAT-4 word reading
subtest standard scores were significantly related to ILK items 16 (r = .367, p = .039) and
20 (r = .374, p = .035). The positive, moderate correlations indicate that higher WRAT-4
word reading subtest standard scores were associated with an increased likelihood of
correctly answering these two items. These items are related to the relationship between
the defendant and the defense attorney, and both have correct answers of “false.”
ILK total scores were significantly correlated with onset of illness (r = .368, p =
.049). This relationship was positive and moderate, suggesting that a later age at which
psychiatric symptoms began was associated with higher total scores on the ILK. Onset of
illness was significantly associated with ILK total scores for civil participants (r = .505, p
= .039), but not forensic participants. In terms of legal variables, ILK total scores were
significantly related to prior incarceration (r = .410, p = .020).

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

66

There was also a significant relationship between gender and ILK total score (r =
-.505, p = .003), with males tending to obtain higher scores on the ILK. The mean ILK
score for males and females was 56.42 (SD = 3.79, range = 45 to 61) and 50.88 (SD =
5.46, range = 40 to 56), respectively. Males correctly answered an average of six more
questions than females. There were 33.33% of the female participants who scored lower
than the highest cut score on the ILK, as compared to 4.17% of males. This mean
difference was statistically and practically significant, t(30) = 3.20, p = .003, d = 1.31;
this significant difference was present when both including and excluding the three low
scoring participants. This relationship was seen among both civil (r = -.545, p = .024) and
forensic (r = -.705, p = .007) participants, with a slightly stronger relationship among
forensic participants. Separate multiple regression analyses were conducted to determine
if males and females differed on the ILK when controlling for several variables that were
thought to contribute to the difference (i.e., education level, severity of illness, experience
with the legal system). These models were the equivalent of an analysis of covariance,
each with only one covariate. In each regression model, one of these variables was
entered in as a predictor variable/covariate. Gender was also entered into each model as a
predictor variable. The dependent variable used for all models was ILK total scores.
Interactions were included to check the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes;
there were no statistically significant interactions between the covariates and gender.
When controlling for forensic status/presence of secondary gain, gender (b = -4.94, p =
.006, sr2 = .442) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for
education, gender (b = -5.37, p = .006, sr2 = .471) was a significant predictor of ILK total
scores. When controlling for WRAT-4 word reading subtest standard scores, gender (b =
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-5.08, p = .004, sr2 = .459) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. When
controlling for prior offenses, gender (b = -5.22, p = .008, sr2 = .456) was a significant
predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for prior incarceration, gender (b = -4.55,
p = .016, sr2 = .391) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for
onset of illness, gender (b = -5.97, p = .001, sr2 = .560) was a significant predictor of ILK
total scores. When controlling for duration of illness, gender (b = -6.51, p = .001, sr2 =
.600) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for
neurodevelopmental disorder, gender (b = -5.53, p = .004, sr2 = .498) was a significant
predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for schizophrenia spectrum disorder,
gender (b = -5.47, p = .004, sr2 = .497) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores.
When controlling for anxiety disorder, gender (b = -5.34, p = .004, sr2 = .484) was a
significant predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for trauma disorder, gender (b
= -5.59, p = .003, sr2 = .508) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. When
controlling for substance use disorder, gender (b = -5.43, p = .004, sr2 = .491) was a
significant predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for personality disorder,
gender (b = -5.38, p = .006, sr2 = .471) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores.
Finally, when controlling for intellectual disability, gender (b = -5.34, p = .004, sr2 =
.484) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores.
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CHAPTER SIX
Discussion
It is important to note that the results of this study were interpreted with the
following limitation in mind. It is possible that no forensic participants feigned during
participation due to the fact that they were aware that participation in the research study
was independent from both their treatment and CST evaluation. The study had no impact
on their legal status and thus they had no incentive to feign during participation. This
limitation restricted the conclusions that I could make about the utility of the ILK in the
present sample, and the results were interpreted accordingly.
6.1 Performance on the ILK
Participants in this sample (M = 55.03, SD = 4.83, range = 40 to 61) performed
similarly to the community psychiatric inpatient reference sample (M = 53.04, SD = 7.59,
range = 29 to 61) referenced in the ILK test manual. The sample used in this study
included more high-scorers than low-scorers; that is, only three participants with the
appropriate reading level scored below the highest cut score on the ILK. These
participants were admitted to the hospital for non-forensic, clinical reasons and had no
history of incarceration. Also, the lowest score obtained in the sample was 11 points
higher than that of the reference sample. It is therefore possible that this sample included
participants who tended to obtain higher scores on the ILK than a larger sample (N = 100)
of psychiatric inpatients. This may be a function of the small sample size. That is, the
sample used in this study may not have been reflective of a larger population of
inpatients. It is also important to note that all of the participants who took the ILK but did
not have the appropriate reading level had a diagnosis of intellectual disability and scored
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below expectation; this suggests that the ILK was not appropriate for use with individuals
with intellectual disability.
It is interesting to note that participants tended to answer “true” to the items
instead of “false,” despite the fact that the correct answers are approximately evenly split
between “true” and “false.” On average, 29 of the 32 participants answered “true” to an
item, whereas only three participants answered “false.” This may mean that this sample
consisted of many “yea-sayers,” or individuals who tend to respond “true” regardless of
the content of the item. Further, it is possible that participants simply guessed throughout
the test and may have correctly answered items by chance. Several items also performed
poorly across subgroups. In both the forensic and civil samples, 25% or more participants
incorrectly answered items 20, 25, and 43. This pattern was also seen for competent
defendants on items 20 and 25. These items tended to be longer than the average
statement length, have a correct answer of “false,” and contain two clauses. Item 25 is
about changing pleas and item 43 is related to the concept of “innocent until proven
guilty.” I hypothesized that item 20, which is about attorney-client confidentiality, would
be difficult for the sample given that Gottfried and Carbonell (2014) found it to be a
difficult item across a range of intelligence levels. Additionally, incompetent defendants
also performed poorly on item 43. Forensic and competent samples performed poorly on
item 59, which has to do with being appointed an attorney if a defendant is unable to
afford one. Moreover, the three participants who scored less than 47 on the ILK
incorrectly answered all of the difficult items except items 44 and 59 (one of the three
participants correctly answered these items). It is also important to note that less than half
of the civil participants correctly answered items 44 and 46 (42.1% and 47.4%,
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respectively). Although these items did not have poor corrected item-total correlations
and high alpha-if-item-deleted values (with the exception of item 43, which did perform
poorly on those measures in the incompetent sample), they may be difficult for inpatients
to correctly answer. Taken together, these findings are troubling given that one tenant of
the ILK is that the items should be so easy that even a very impaired person or someone
with limited knowledge of the legal system should be able to correctly answer the
majority, if not all, of the items. It is also interesting that in Rogers and colleagues (2015)
examination of short forms of the ILK, all of the items found to be difficult for the
current sample (items 20, 25, 43, 44, 46, and 59), with the exception of item 59, were
excluded from both the R-ILK-90, on which only items that 90% of their sample
correctly answered were retained, and R-ILK-95, on which only items that 95% of their
sample correctly answered were retained.
The average inter-item correlation for the total sample was .08; this is very low
but is comparable to the findings of prior studies (r = .32; Otto et al., 2010). This may
indicate that the items measure different constructs. Two items in particular performed
poorly across subgroups in terms of the corrected item-total correlation, alpha if item
were deleted value, and inter-item correlations: item 44, which is about types of pleas,
and item 60, which has to do with who can sit on a jury.
6.1.1 Forensically- and civilly-committed participants. Forensic participants in
this sample (M = 57.23, SD = 2.98, range = 51 to 61) obtained higher scores on the ILK
than the reference sample of adults adjudicated incompetent to proceed (M = 50.04, SD =
8.54, range = 29 to 61; Otto et al., 2010). This is inconsistent with my expectations that
were based on the results of prior studies that found the ILK to be useful for
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differentiating between groups asked to feigned incompetence and those asked to respond
honestly (Gottfried et al., 2015; Guenther & Otto, 2010; Otto et al., 2010; Rogers et al.,
2015). No forensic participants in this sample were classified as possible feigners,
whereas the lowest score in the reference sample was in the chance region. It is possible
that this sample was a group of forensic participants who scored higher on the ILK than
other samples of forensic inpatients. Given that higher verbal intelligence and prior
experience with the legal system were found to be related to higher ILK scores, this
discrepancy may be explained by this sample of forensic patients tending to have higher
verbal intelligence and more experience with the legal system than other forensic
samples. However, verbal intelligence was not significantly related to ILK scores in the
forensic sample, so it could be that prior legal experience alone accounted for the
discrepancy. Many of the forensic participants had a history of prior incarceration
(76.5%) and/or a prior offense (88.2%); additionally, many of these participants may
have had previous evaluations of competence to stand trial. These experiences may
account for why forensic participants were able to correctly answer more questions on
average about the legal system.
Consistent with my hypothesis, civil participants in this sample (M = 53.53, SD =
5.33, range = 40 to 59) performed more similarly to their most similar reference sample,
the community psychiatric inpatients (M = 53.04, SD = 7.59, range = 29 to 61; Otto et al.,
2010), than the forensic participants (M = 57.23, SD = 2.98, range = 51 to 61). However,
similar to the forensic participants, the lowest score obtained in this sample of civil
participants was 11 points higher than that of the reference sample. It is again possible
that this sample of civil participants was a group of inpatients who tended to have more
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high-scorers than in other samples of inpatients admitted for non-forensic, clinical
reasons. One possible reason for this discrepancy may be that this sample of civil patients
tended to have higher verbal intelligence than other clinical samples, given that higher
verbal intelligence was related to higher ILK scores in the civil sample. There was also a
significant relationship between onset of illness and ILK scores, with later onset
associated with higher ILK scores. Thus, it could be that this sample of civil participants
tended to have higher ILK scores than other samples because they had a later average
onset than other samples.
Although there was a statistically and practically significant mean difference
between the ILK scores of the forensic and civil participants, this mean difference was
controlled for by prior offenses, prior incarceration, duration of illness, onset of illness,
and presence of an anxiety disorder, personality disorder, or intellectual disability. Prior
offenses and incarceration likely controlled for the mean difference because more
forensic participants had a prior offense (92.31% of forensic compared to 73.68% of
civil) and/or had been previously incarcerated (76.92% of forensic compared to 15.79%
of civil). That is, experience with the legal system likely contributed to their higher total
score. The idea that forensic participants scored higher on the ILK due in part to prior
experience with the legal system, and certainly more recent experience than civil
participants, is further supported by the fact that forensic participants had a higher
percentage of correct responses than civil participants on a majority of the items (n = 39).
In terms of duration and onset of illness, civil participants tended to have a shorter
duration and earlier onset of illness. This finding can largely be explained by the lower
average age of civil participants as compared to forensic participants. Although not
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significantly different, the mean age of the civil participants was 35.05, while the mean
age of forensic participants was 41.46. Types of diagnoses did not seem to vary widely
between the two groups, and the only PAS subscale that the groups differed on was
Alienation, t(30) = -2.47, p = .019, d = .89. Presence of an anxiety disorder and
intellectual disability may have controlled for the mean difference in ILK scores because
the only participants who were diagnosed with each disorder were forensic participants.
Similarly, the majority of the participants diagnosed with a personality disorder were
civil (five civil participants as compared to one forensic participant), which likely
explains why presence of a personality disorder controlled for the mean difference in ILK
scores.
6.1.2 Competent and incompetent defendants. Defendants opined to be
competent in this sample (M = 57.00, SD = 3.51, range = 51 to 61) obtained higher scores
on the ILK than the reference sample of adult competency examinees opined to be
competent (M = 50.42, SD = 6.85, range = 34 to 60; Otto et al., 2010). Similarly,
incompetent defendants (M = 58.33, SD = 3.06, range = 55 to 61) not only performed
better than the competent defendants, but also obtained an average score well above that
of the reference sample of adult competency examinees opined to be incompetent (M =
40.59, SD = 8.53, range = 29 to 55; Otto et al., 2010). Further, incompetent defendants
obtained a higher percentage of correct responses than competent defendants on 16 of the
items. These findings are inconsistent with my expectations and the results of prior
research that found that incompetent defendants performed significantly worse than those
opined competent (Otto et al., 2010). There were no significant differences between the
groups in terms of demographic, clinical, or legal variables that might explain the mean
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difference. However, the sample sizes for these two subgroups were very small (n = 7 for
competent and n = 3 for incompetent), and it may be that these samples were not
representative of the general population of defendants admitted to an inpatient hospital
for an evaluation of trial competence. Another possible explanation is that the
incompetent defendants were thought to be incompetent because they were unable to
work with their attorney or had deficits in rational understanding, rather than due to a
lack of understanding of the legal system. That is, it is possible that the competent and
incompetent defendants had comparable levels of legal knowledge. The incompetent
defendants likely were also undergoing competence restoration treatment at the time of
participation in the study. This treatment typically involves attending group classes
designed to educate patients about the legal system and/or meeting one-on-one with a
staff member to learn general facts about the legal process. Such interventions may have
increased these defendants’ levels of knowledge of the legal process to be similar to that
of the competent defendants. Additionally, it is unclear from this sample of defendants if
there is a typical way in which competent and incompetent defendants respond to the
items on the ILK, and if those response patterns differ.
6.2 Reliability and Validity of the ILK
6.2.1 Reliability. Prior studies have found that internal consistency reliability of
the ILK to be .88 (Otto et al., 2010) and .91 (Guenther & Otto, 2010). The internal
consistency reliability estimate from the current sample was slightly lower at .806, but is
still considered desirable according to standards for Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951).
It is interesting to note that, across the subgroups, alpha was quite a bit lower for the
forensic participants at .652 than any of the other subgroups. This may indicate that the
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ILK functioned differently for forensic participants; specifically, the items may have been
less related. Perhaps having more legal experience lead this group to overthink some of
their answers to some of the items and thus respond in ways that were incongruent with
the purpose of the test. This is further supported the average inter-item correlation for the
forensic participants (r = .071), which was the lowest of all the subgroups. Alternatively,
the forensic group may have had the lowest alpha value due to there being less variability
in these participants’ total scores (SD = 2.98) than the other groups. Reliability
coefficients are small when the true score variance of a group is small. When excluding
the six difficult items, the alpha coefficients for the total sample, civil participants, and
competent defendants decreased. The alpha coefficients for the forensic participants and
incompetent defendants increased slightly. This suggests that, overall, exclusion of those
items does not notably increase the reliability of the instrument.
6.2.2 Validity. I expected a moderate, negative correlation between ILK scores
and presence of secondary gain if the instrument functioned as a validity test in the
sample; that is, likelihood to feign incompetence was thought to be associated with a low
ILK score. Although the observed correlation was moderate, there was a positive
relationship between ILK scores and secondary gain. That is, presence of secondary gain
(i.e., having a forensic status) was associated with better performance on the ILK. This
may suggest that the ILK functioned more similarly to a test of legal knowledge in this
sample given that those with possibly more experience, and certainly more recent
experience, with the legal system obtained a higher score on the test than those admitted
to the hospital non-forensic, clinical reasons. Further, there was a significant and practical
difference between the average ILK scores of forensic and civil participants, with
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forensic participants answering an average of four more questions correctly. I expected
forensic participants to have lower ILK scores than the civil participants given that they
have more of an incentive to feign incompetence. As mentioned earlier, it is important to
note that forensic status was used as a proxy for feigning, and it is likely that no
participants feigned incompetence during participation due to lack of incentive to do so.
This mean difference was controlled for by prior offenses, prior incarceration, duration of
illness, onset of illness, and presence of an anxiety disorder, personality disorder, or
intellectual disability. As previously discussed, it is likely that prior experience with the
legal system and less severe symptoms at the time of participation account for why
forensic participants performed better on the ILK. The fact that variables related to prior
criminal justice experience controlled for the mean difference between the two groups
suggests that the difference in performance on the ILK is due in part to exposure to the
legal system; this provides more support for the function of the instrument as a test of
legal knowledge in this sample.
The incompetent defendants in this sample performed quite differently than those
in prior studies (Otto et al., 2010), as previously mentioned. Specifically, they performed
approximately the same on the ILK as competent defendants. I expected that, if the ILK
functioned as a test of legal knowledge in this sample, the incompetent defendants would
score much lower than those opined to be competent if the incompetent defendants were
opined to be incompetent due to a lack of understanding of the legal system. The similar
performance of the two groups may suggest that ILK performance is not related to
impairment level or a lack of understanding of the legal system, given that incompetent
defendants tend to be opined incompetent due to illness severity and/or a lack of

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

77

understanding of the nature of the legal process. Contrary to the results of the forensic
and civil participant comparison, this group comparison suggests that the ILK may have
functioned as a validity test in this sample. However, as previously discussed, it may
have been that the incompetent defendants had similar levels of legal knowledge as the
competent defendants.
Convergent validity evidence was also examined. Although ILK scores and RFIT
combination scores were not significantly related, there was a moderate, positive
correlation between ILK scores and RFIT recall scores. There was also no relationship
between ILK scores and PAS total probability scores. It is troubling that, although
participants did score below the cut scores on the RFIT and the ILK, no participants were
classified as possible feigners on both validity measures. Similarly, no participants who
scored below expectation on the ILK were classified as potential feigners on the PAS.
That is, there was no convergent validity between the ILK and the other validity
measures. This finding is in stark contrast to a prior study in which a moderate, positive
correlation was found between the RFIT and the ILK (Otto et al., 2011). This may have
occurred because the RFIT evaluates cognitive effort rather than feigned incompetence
like the ILK; the three participants who scored below the cut score on the ILK and thus
may have been feigning incompetence likely were not also feigning cognitive deficits.
Similarly, the six participants who scored above expectation on the PAS may have only
been exaggerating psychological symptoms rather than feigning incompetence. It is
interesting to note, however, that three participants were classified as feigning on the
PAS and the RFIT combination and two participants were classified as feigning on the
PAS and RFIT recall. Perhaps these participants were using multiple feigning strategies
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(i.e., exaggerating memory deficits and symptom severity), but were not feigning
incompetence.
I expected the range to be restricted above the highest cut score (i.e., 48 and
higher) for the total sample. Additionally, I expected only those who had secondary gain
in the form of legal charges to score below the highest cut score (i.e., 47). When
examining a bar chart of the distribution of scores by forensic status, it is clear that the
majority of the scores were located above 48 (see Figure 1). However, only civil
participants scored below 47. The three participants who were classified as possible
feigners may have been more impaired than the average participants. Two of the
participants did poorly on the RFIT, although they did not score below the cut scores.
Two of the participants had a reading level as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading
subtest that was lower than the total sample’s average reading level, indicating that these
participants may have had poor verbal intelligence as compared to others. Additionally,
none of the three participants had any prior experience with the legal system. It may be
that they performed poorly on the ILK due to their lack of exposure to the legal system
and/or because of lower overall functioning. In either case, this provides some support
against the function of the ILK as a validity test in this sample given that even an
impaired person with limited criminal justice experience should be able to obtain a score
above 47. On the other hand, it may also be that these participants represent outliers and
were not representative of the larger population of psychiatric inpatients.
6.3 Performance in Relation to Other Variables
Verbal intelligence as measured by the WRAT-4 seemed to be related to ILK
performance in this sample, which is consistent with a prior finding that found a

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

79

moderate, positive relationship between a measure of intelligence and ILK scores
(Gottfried & Carbonell, 2014). There was a moderate, positive relationship between
WRAT-4 word reading subtest scores and ILK scores. That is, higher verbal skills were
associated with higher scores on the ILK. This significant relationship was found for the
total sample and the civil participants, but not for forensic participants. This may be
because the range of WRAT-4 standard scores was more restricted for the forensic
participants (range = 80 to 111) as compared to the civil participants (range = 79 to 113).
Additionally, only four (30.8%) forensic participants obtained a score below the mean for
the total sample of 88.95, while nine (47.4%) civil participants scored lower than the
mean. In particular, items 16 and 20 were related to the WRAT-4 word reading subtest
scores with moderate, positive correlations. These items have to do with the relationship
between the defendant and defense attorney, and both have correct answers of “false.”
Presumably, these items require a higher verbal intelligence or cognitive capacity in order
to provide a correct response because in order to correctly answer them, the examinee
would have to know that the true statement is the opposite of the given statement. The
positive, moderate correlations indicated that better verbal intelligence was associated
with an increased likelihood of correctly answering these items. A relationship between
verbal skills and ILK scores is not desirable if the ILK is to be used as a validity test. It
would not be desirable for individuals with low intelligence to be classified as possible
feigners if they are responding to the best of their ability.
ILK scores were significantly associated with onset of illness and prior
incarceration, both with a moderate, positive relationship. That is, higher scores on the
ILK were associated with a later age at which psychiatric symptoms began and having
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had a prior incarceration. Onset of illness was only significantly related to ILK scores
within civil participants, not forensic. This may be because there was less variability in
the scores of forensic participants (SD = 2.98) as compared to civil participants (SD =
5.34). Additionally, only six (50% of those with a reported onset) forensic participants
had an onset earlier than the total average, while 12 (70.6% of those with a reported
onset) civil participants had an earlier onset. Presumably having a later onset of illness is
associated with lower severity of illness (i.e., less time for symptoms to manifest). It also
may be that those with a later onset of illness completed more years of education, which
tends to be related to better functional outcomes. Indeed, of those who took the ILK, had
an appropriate reading level for the ILK (≥ 5th grade), and had an onset of illness later
than the average onset (n = 11), none did not complete high school and four completed
more than 12 years of education. In contrast, of those who had an earlier onset (n = 18),
six did not complete high school and two completed more than 12 years of education.
The correlation between prior incarceration and performance on the ILK is further
support that the ILK may have functioned as a test of legal knowledge in this sample, as
previously discussed. In sum, it appears that ILK scores were related to proxies for illness
severity and exposure to the legal system.
Oddly, the mean total ILK score for females (M = 50.88, SD = 5.46) was
significantly lower than that of males (M = 56.42, SD = 3.79). This mean difference
persisted even after controlling for forensic status/presence of secondary gain, education,
WRAT-4 word reading subtest scores, prior offenses, prior incarceration, diagnoses,
onset of illness, and duration of illness. This may have occurred because of those who
scored below 47 on the ILK, two were females and one was male. That is, 33.3% of
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females scored below the highest cut score, while only 4.2% of males obtained that low
of a score. This mean difference is thought to be a spurious finding of the sample, given
that there is no theoretical reason to explain why females performed more poorly on the
ILK than males.
6.4 Conclusion
6.4.1 Psychometric properties of the ILK. The reliability estimate for the total
sample provided support for adequate reliability of the ILK when used in this sample,
although the estimate was lower than estimates found in prior studies. However, the
average inter-item correlation for the total sample was very low and may indicate that not
all of the items on the ILK were measuring the same construct (i.e., feigned
incompetence).
In terms of validity evidence, the results were mixed. Initially, the strongest
support for the ILK functioning like a validity test in this sample was the lack of a mean
difference between competent and incompetent defendants; presumably this indicates that
impairment and a possible lack of understanding of the nature of the legal process were
unrelated to performance on the test, assuming that no participants were feigning and the
defendants were opined incompetent due to a lack of understanding of the legal system.
However, both onset of illness and prior incarceration were related to ILK performance,
which suggests that severity of symptoms and prior exposure to the legal system actually
were related to performance on the ILK. The range of total scores on the ILK was mostly
restricted to above the highest cut score. This finding may mean that the test did function
as a validity test, given that I expected the majority of the scores to be located above the
highest cut score if the test functioned like a typical performance validity test. That is, the
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majority of items may have been so easy that those who were not feigning were able to
score well above the highest cut score. Alternatively, this result could indicate that this
sample had generally high levels of legal knowledge that enabled them to perform fairly
well on the test. However, I also expected that only forensic participants would score
below the cut score. The fact that only civil participants with no prior exposure to the
legal system scored below expectation on the test, therefore, further supports the idea that
the test may not have functioned as a validity measure in the sample. Additionally, the
finding that variables related previous legal experience eliminated the mean difference
between forensic and civil participants indicates that forensic participants obtained higher
total ILK scores due in part to their prior legal experience.
Evidence of convergent validity was also lacking. ILK scores did correlate with
presence of secondary gain/forensic status. The relationship was positive rather than
negative; a negative correlation would have indicated that presence of secondary gain
was associated with lower ILK total scores, thereby supporting its utility as a validity test.
The positive relationship reflects the fact that forensic participants performed better on
the ILK than civil participants in this sample, which supports the idea of the ILK
functioning like a test of legal knowledge. ILK scores were not related to PAS total
probability scores, and no participants who scored above expectation on the PAS also
scored below expectation on the ILK. Although ILK scores were related to RFIT recall
scores, it is perplexing that no participants were classified as possible feigners by both the
RFIT and ILK. As previously discussed, it is possible that if any participants were
feigning, they feigned either only memory deficits or a lack of legal knowledge. The PAS
was used as a symptom validity measure. It makes sense that participants may have been
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exaggerating psychiatric symptoms but not feigning incompetence, which would explain
why the scores were not related and no participants were classified as possible feigners
on both measures. Similarly, the RFIT is a test of memory and participants may have
been exaggerating memory deficits but not a feigned lack of legal knowledge. This
difference in feigning strategies would explain why no participants were classified as
feigners on both measures. Alternatively, it is possible that participants had trouble with a
memory test (i.e., the RFIT) but not questions about the legal system, or vice versa.
6.4.2 Concerns regarding use of the ILK in an inpatient setting. Several items
appeared to be difficult for both the total sample and subgroups. Many of these items
were found to not be answered correctly by 95% of a sample used to examine short forms
of the ILK (Rogers et al., 2015). Taken together, these results suggest that not all items
on the ILK are so easy that virtually everyone can correctly answer them, which is a core
tenant of the ILK. Caution should be taken when interpreting the results of the ILK when
using these items, particularly if a defendant is classified as possibly feigning and the
majority of their incorrect responses were on these items. Particular attention should be
paid to items 16 and 20, which were related to a measure of verbal intelligence. It is also
important to note that ILK total scores were related to verbal skills, with higher scores
associated with better WRAT-4 word reading subtest scores. This suggests that the ILK
may not be appropriate for use with very low functioning defendants or defendants
experiencing active symptoms that may cause serious impairment. Moreover, the ILK
was not appropriate for use with individuals with a diagnosis of intellectual disability in
this sample given that all of the participants who took the test but did not have the
appropriate reading level scored below expectation (i.e., were classified as feigning) and
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were diagnosed with intellectual disability (n = 4). This is a particularly important finding
given the high prevalence of intellectual disability in forensic populations.
It is also important to think about the ethical implications of utilizing the ILK in
clinical forensic settings, given that labeling a defendant as a feigner can have serious
consequences. Consistent with the test authors’ recommendations, the results of the study
suggest that a reading test should be given in addition to the ILK in order to ensure that
interpretation of ILK results are warranted. As previously discussed, in the current
sample, all participants who took the ILK but did not have an appropriate reading level
scored below 47 on the test (n = 4). Three of these participants had completed high
school and the fourth participant had completed 11 years of education. Thus, education
level should not be used as a proxy for reading level. I would also like to suggest against
clinicians using the ILK as the only indication of feigning. The results of the current
study suggest that more research is needed to determine if the ILK functions as a typical
validity test; therefore, the conclusions one can make from the test as it is currently
constructed are limited. Clinicians should consider the results of other validity tests and
obtain collateral information from all available sources (e.g., family, friends, treating
psychologist and psychiatrist, unit staff members, and/or attorney) when making opinions
regarding feigning.
6.5 Limitations, Implications, and Recommendations for Future Research
As previously mentioned, the most notable limitation of this study was use of
forensic participants as a proxy for feigners. The study had no impact on their legal status
and thus they had no incentive to feign during participation. That is, it is likely that the
forensic participants represented a group who had more, and certainly more recent,
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exposure to the legal system than the civil participants, rather than a group more likely to
feign incompetence than civil participants. This limitation restricted the conclusions that I
could make about the utility of the ILK in the present sample. The small sample size
placed additional limitations on possible inferences that could be drawn from the results
of the study. Specifically, the sample included a small number of forensic participants for
comparison. The sample may also not be representative of the larger population of
psychiatric inpatients; it may be that the civil sample consisted of especially low-scorers
and the forensic sample consisted of especially high-scorers. Further, parameter estimates
(e.g., mean scores) tend to have a great deal of sampling error when small samples are
used, which limits how much confidence can be placed in inferences that are made about
the population based on estimates from the small sample.
Despite the limitations, the current study contributes to the literature on the ILK
by examining its utility in a design that mirrored a situation in which the ILK would
actually be administered in practice more so than the simulation designs that have
previously been used to examine the function of the ILK (Gottfried et al., 2015; Guenther
& Otto, 2010; Otto et al., 2010; Rogers et al., 2015). The sample also included
individuals diagnosed with intellectual disability; the utility of the ILK when used with
those with intellectual disability has only been examined in a few prior studies.
Additionally, it is useful for forensic evaluators to know the reliability and validity
evidence of a test so that they can make an informed decision regarding use of the test in
their evaluations. It may also be useful for forensic evaluators to be able to speak to the
psychometric properties of the instrument in the event that they are asked to testify on a
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case in which they used the ILK. Evaluators should also be aware of items that tend to
perform poorly so they can properly frame their findings in their reports.
I would like to make recommendations for future research on the utility of the
ILK in psychiatric inpatient samples. First, it is important to evaluate its effectiveness for
detecting feigned incompetence in a larger sample so as to decrease sampling error and
increase the precision of the parameter estimates. It would be interesting to include
samples of inpatients from a range of hospitals in order to obtain a sample that is
representative of the population of inpatients across all psychiatric hospitals. Second,
future research could focus on examining the psychometric properties of short forms of
the ILK, as was done by Rogers and colleagues (2015). With the exception of one item,
the items found to be difficult for the sample used in this study were excluded from
Rogers and colleagues’ (2015) short forms of the ILK because the majority of their
sample did not correctly answer those items. Their short forms tended to have better
psychometric properties than the full ILK. Taken together, these results suggest that those
items may need to be removed from the ILK in order to improve its utility for detecting
feigning. On the other hand, research could be done to determine if simplifying the
language of these items improves the rate of correct responses. Third, although
simulation studies with known groups are useful for evaluating the psychometric
properties of the ILK in a controlled design, they are limited in that they are not
representative of a situation in which the ILK would be administered in practice. One
possible design would be similar to that of the current study, but would include the
important addition of obtaining the treatment team’s and/or evaluator’s opinion regarding
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whether they believed that the defendant was feigning incompetence or experiencing
genuine symptoms that are impeding competence-related abilities.
If unlimited time and resources were available, I would design a study in which a
battery of tests was administered to defendants admitted to a psychiatric hospital for an
evaluation of adjudicative competence. Ideally, the defendants would be randomly
sampled from several psychiatric hospitals representing different regions of the country
to obtain a total sample that is representative of the population of defendants undergoing
CST evaluations. I would assemble a test battery consisting of the ILK, the WRAT-4
word reading subtest, an intelligence test, a listening comprehension test, a working
memory test, several SVTs, and several PVTs. The WRAT-4 word reading subtest would
be used to obtain the reading level of the defendant to determine if interpretation of the
ILK is warranted, and the intelligence test would serve as a measure of general
intelligence. The listening comprehension test and working memory test would be
pertinent given that the ILK is read aloud to examinees. Possible SVTs include the
Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology and the symptom validity scales in
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2. Possible PVTs include the Test of
Memory Malingering, the Dot Counting Test, and the Rey Fifteen Item Memory Test
plus Recognition. I would correlate scores on these measures to scores on the ILK and
identify defendants who were classified as feigning on multiple measures; this would
allow me to determine if individuals engaging in different types of feigning strategies are
also likely to feign incompetence.
The day of or the day before the defendant participates in the study, I would
obtain an opinion from both the treating psychiatrist and psychologist, and possibly other
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treatment team members or the forensic evaluator, regarding whether the defendant is
feigning incompetence. I would compare the opinions of the professionals to get multiple
viewpoints on the likelihood of a defendant feigning. Additionally, the opinions would be
compared to the ultimate decision made by the forensic evaluator regarding trial
competence. The scores on the tests could also be correlated with the opinions and
ultimate decision to see which tests have the strongest relationship with an external
indication of feigning. Logistic regression analyses could also be conducted. The
dependent variables would be the opinions of the treating professionals, and the
predictors would be test scores. This analysis would allow me to determine how the ILK
compares to other validity tests in terms of its ability to predict feigning. It would also be
interesting to construct a hierarchical linear regression model to determine if likelihood of
feigning varies as a function of characteristics of psychiatric hospitals. I would conduct
an item analysis, as was done for the current study, to get a sense of what items perform
poorly or seem to be difficult for the sample. This type of research design would allow
for evaluation of the utility of the ILK in a legitimate, non-artificial way that also
incorporates both an external indication of feigning and several other measures of both
symptom and cognitive feigning strategies.
Although this design would not remove the limitation of the current study that the
participants may not have any incentive to feign during participation, it would eliminate
using forensic participants as a proxy for a group more likely to feign because the results
of the defendants would not need to be compared to another group (i.e., participants
admitted for clinical reasons). This would be a more desirable approach because the
researcher would not assume that all defendants are more likely to feign simply because
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of the presence of secondary gain. Additionally, a larger sample size should result in a
sample that is more representative of the population and has less sampling error; this
would remedy the limitations of the current study that are associated with a small sample
size.
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Table 1
Sample ILK Items
Item Number

90

Item Content

8

In court, people are supposed to do what the judge says.

20

The judge must be told everything that the defendant tells the defense
lawyer.

43

The judge is supposed to assume that the defendant is not guilty.

Note. Reproduced by special permission of the Publisher, Psychological Assessment Resources,
Inc. (PAR), 16204 North Florida Avenue, Lutz, Florida 33549, from the Inventory of Legal
Knowledge™ by Jeffrey E. Musick, PhD, ABPP and Randy K. Otto, PhD, ABPP, Copyright
2010 by PAR. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission from PAR.
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Table 2
Demographic Information
Total
(N = 40)

Forensic
(n = 17)

Civil
(n = 23)

Competent
(n = 8)

Incompetent
(n = 4)

36.73 (13.79)

38.88 (13.29)

35.13 (14.23)

39.13 (12.88)

43.50 (14.01)

30 (75%)
10 (25%)

15 (88.2%)
2 (11.8%)

15 (65.2%)
8 (34.8%)

6 (75%)
2 (25%)

4 (100%)
---

Ethnicity
Caucasian
African-American
Asian
Other

23 (57.75%)
9 (22.5%)
1 (2.5%)
7 (17.5%)

7 (41.2%)
5 (29.4%)
1 (5.9%)
4 (23.5%)

16 (69.6%)
4 (17.4%)
--2 (13%)

2 (25%)
2 (25%)
1 (12.5%)
3 (37.5%)

1 (25%)
2 (50%)
--1 (25%)

Education

12.33 (1.99)

12.65 (1.54)

12.09 (2.27)

13.13 (2.10)

12.50 (1.00)

12 (30%)

6 (35.3%)

6 (26.1%)

2 (25%)

2 (50%)

Employment Status
Unemployed
Disabled
Employed

29 (72.5%)
10 (25%)
1 (2.5%)

17 (100%)
-----

12 (52.2%)
10 (43.5%)
1 (4.3%)

8 (100%)
-----

4 (100%)
-----

Marital Status
Never Married
Divorced
Married

27 (67.5%)
10 (25%)
3 (7.5%)

11 (64.7%)
5 (29.4%)
1 (5.9%)

16 (69.6%)
5 (21.7%)
2 (8.7%)

4 (50%)
4 (50%)
---

3 (75%)
1 (25%)
---

30 (75%)

14 (82.4%)

16 (69.6%)

5 (62.5%)

4 (100%)

Demographic Variables
Age
Gender
Male
Female

Special Education

Medical History

(continued)

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

92

Table 2 (continued)
Demographic Information
Total
(N = 40)

Forensic
(n = 17)

Civil
(n = 23)

Competent
(n = 8)

Incompetent
(n = 4)

Substance Use History

30 (75%)

13 (76.5%)

17 (73.9%)

6 (75%)

3 (75%)

Prior Psychiatric Hospitalization

36 (90%)

16 (94.1%)

20 (87%)

7 (87.5%)

4 (100%)

Prior Psychiatric Medication

36 (90%)

15 (88.2%)

21 (91.3%)

6 (75%)

4 (100%)

Prior Offenses

30 (75%)

15 (88.2%)

15 (65.2%)

8 (100%)

3 (75%)

Prior Incarceration

17 (42.5%)

13 (76.5%)

4 (17.4%)

6 (75%)

3 (75%)

Onset of Illness
(n = 33, 15, 18, 3, 7)1

21.27 (9.47)

22.87 (11.28)

19.94 (7.73)

23.14 (9.81)

33.00 (15.87)

Duration of Illness
(n = 35, 16, 19, 3, 8)1

15.46 (11.28)

17.06 (9.78)

14.11 (12.50)

18.88 (8.56)

10.00 (13.86)

8 (20%)
20 (50%)
11 (27.5%)
1 (2.5%)
1 (2.5%)
5 (12.5%)
17 (42.5%)
7 (17.5%)
7 (17.5%)

4 (23.5%)
11 (64.7%)
4 (23.5%)
--1 (5.9%)
2 (11.8%)
7 (41.2%)
1 (5.9%)
4 (23.5%)

4 (17.4%)
9 (39.1%)
7 (30.4%)
1 (2.5%)
--3 (13%)
10 (43.5%)
6 (26.1%)
3 (13%)

2 (25%)
5 (62.5%)
2 (25%)
--1 (12.5%)
1 (12.5%)
4 (50%)
--2 (25%)

--4 (100%)
--------1 (25%)
-----

Demographic Variables

Diagnoses2
Neurodevelopmental
Schizophrenia Spectrum
Bipolar
Depression
Anxiety
Trauma Disorder
Substance Use Disorder
Personality Disorder
Intellectual Disability

Note. Data are listed as mean (standard deviation) or number of participants (percentage). 1 Data were not available regarding onset and duration of illness for
all participants. Sample sizes are listed for total, forensic, civil, competent, and incompetent samples. 2 Both primary and secondary diagnoses are reported. It
is possible that a patient had multiple diagnoses.
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Table 3
Criminal and Legal Information for Forensic Sample
Forensic
(n = 17)

Competent
(n = 8)

Incompetent
(n = 4)

2.53 (1.70, 1 to 6)
1 (1.12, 0 to 6)
1.53 (1.51, 0 to 4)

2.88 (1.85, 1 to 6)
1.25 (1.49, 0 to 4)
1.63 (1.85, 0 to 6)

2.25 (1.50, 1 to 4)
1 (.816, 0 to 2)
1.25 (.957, 0 to 2)

Multiple Offenses

10 (58.8%)

5 (62.5%)

2 (50%)

Court Finding of Competence
Competent
Undetermined

7 (41.2%)
10 (58.8%)

5 (62.5%)
3 (37.5%)

--4 (100%)

Criminal and Legal Variables
Number of Offenses
Felonies
Misdemeanors

Note. Data are listed as mean (standard deviation, range) or number of participants (percentage).
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Table 4
Test Scores
Total
(N = 40)

Forensic
(n = 17)

Civil
(n = 23)

Competent
(n = 8)

Incompetent
(n = 4)

ILK (n = 32, 13, 19, 7, 3)1
Total
Cumulative Percentile
Probability Score

55.03 (4.83)
63.94 (24.84)
.9998 (.000)

57.23 (2.98)
75.00 (20.34)
.9999 (.000)

53.53 (5.34)
56.37 (25.26)
.9996 (.001)

57.00 (3.51)
74.00 (22.46)
.9999 (.000)

58.33 (3.06)
82.00 (22.87)
.9999 (.000)

RFIT (n = 39, 17, 22, 8, 4)
Recall
Recognition
False Positive Recognitions
Combination

12.18 (3.55)
11.95 (3.41)
0.87 (1.58)
23.28 (7.20)

12.12 (3.94)
11.82 (3.81)
1.12 (1.90)
22.82 (8.19)

12.23 (3.32)
12.05 (3.15)
0.68 (1.29)
23.64 (6.52)

12.50 (4.07)
13.00 (3.74)
1.13 (2.23)
24.38 (7.80)

13.00 (2.45)
11.25 (1.71)
1.25 (1.89)
23.00 (4.90)

WRAT-4 Word Reading
(n = 37, 16, 21, 8, 4)
Raw
Standard Score
Grade Equivalent

52.51 (8.48)
88.95 (10.98)
9.64 (2.97)

52.13 (8.96)
88.00 (11.04)
9.66 (3.20)

52.81 (8.31)
89.67 (11.15)
9.63 (2.87)

55.14 (3.72)
91.00 (4.36)
10.90 (1.27)

56.33 (8.62)
94.67 (15.57)
10.57 (3.22)

Test Variables

(continued)
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Table 4 (continued)
Test Scores
Test Variables
PAS Probability Scores
Total (n = 32, 11, 21, 6, 3)
Negative Affect (n = 38, 15, 23, 8, 4)
Acting Out (n = 38, 15, 23, 8, 4)
Health Problems (n = 37, 14, 23, 7, 4)
Psychotic Features (n = 37, 15, 22, 8, 4)
Social Withdrawal (n = 38, 16, 22, 8, 4)
Hostile Control (n = 37, 14, 23,7, 4)
Suicidal Thinking (n = 39, 16, 23, 8, 4)
Alienation (n = 39, 16, 23, 8, )
Alcohol Problems (n = 39, 16, 23, 8, 4)
Anger Control (n = 36, 13, 23, 8, 3)

Total
(N = 40)

Forensic
(n = 17)

Civil
(n = 23)

Competent
(n = 8)

Incompetent
(n = 4)

74.42 (31.75)
63.31 (28.06)
64.44 (18.53)
67.49 (22.90)
73.78 (23.79)
66.56 (19.24)
53.44 (6.54)
61.92 (25.59)
64.26 (23.72)
47.90 (14.39)
55.43 (16.60)

74.97 (32.90)
61.99 (31.90)
62.37 (17.73)
66.66 (21.79)
81.98 (18.38)
64.31 (16.57)
51.81 (6.74)
54.36 (25.65)
76.48 (18.66)
48.96 (19.20)
54.32 (16.23)

74.13 (31.96)
64.18 (25.98)
65.79 (19.31)
68.00 (24.02)
68.18 (25.77)
68.20 (21.20)
54.44 (6.35)
67.17 (24.74)
55.76 (23.47)
47.18 (10.23)
56.06 (17.13)

72.25 (39.71)
63.33 (34.29)
65.29 (15.25)
63.27 (22.33)
80.74 (21.74)
65.56 (15.12)
50.32 (5.43)
56.89 (27.82)
74.43 (24.56)
49.76 (20.62)
51.33 (13.40)

88.16 (18.34)
60.55 (33.00)
51.75 (25.57)
81.08 (17.42)
90.25 (7.49)
56.33 (24.71)
56.00 (10.22)
49.73 (22.25)
81.30 (14.94)
53.05 (27.41)
64.70 (24.24)

Note. Data are listed as mean (standard deviation). Complete data were not available for all participants. Sample sizes are listed for total, forensic, civil,
competent, and incompetent samples. ILK = Inventory of Legal Knowledge. RFIT = Rey Fifteen Item Test. WRAT-4 = Wide Range Achievement Test Version
4. PAS = Personality Assessment Screener. 1 Data for the ILK include only those who had a grade equivalent WRAT-4 score of equal to or above 5th grade.
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Table 5
Item Analysis for Total Sample

Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Corrected Item-Total Correlation
0.235
0.315
0.168
--0.194
--0.407
0.164
0.202
--0.336
0.347
0.116
0.238
0.008
0.595
0.031
0.116
--0.547
0.116
0.170
0.542
0.032
0.506
------0.365
--0.170
0.360
0.168
0.257
0.542
0.308
---0.111
0.542
--0.373
0.207
0.432
0.053
0.116
0.318
0.337
0.474
0.360
0.170

Alpha-If-Item-Deleted
0.803
0.801
0.805
--0.805
--0.797
0.806
0.805
--0.800
0.802
0.806
0.803
0.809
0.792
0.809
0.806
--0.790
0.806
0.805
0.799
0.808
0.793
------0.800
--0.805
0.799
0.805
0.803
0.799
0.803
--0.809
0.799
--0.799
0.805
0.796
0.813
0.806
0.801
0.801
0.797
0.799
0.805
(continued)

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

97

Table 5 (continued)
Item Analysis for Total Sample
Item
Corrected Item-Total Correlation
Alpha-If-Item-Deleted
51
----52
----53
0.113
0.807
54
0.353
0.799
55
0.381
0.799
56
0.002
0.807
57
-0.035
0.808
58
0.254
0.803
59
0.053
0.809
60
0.308
0.803
61
0.235
0.803
Note. Corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values are only reported if all participants
did not respond in the same way to the item.
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Table 6
Item Discrimination Statistics

Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

% Correct
by Forensic
92.3
84.6
100
100
92.3
100
76.9
84.6
84.6
100
76.9
100
100
92.3
100
100
100
92.3
100
69.2
100
92.3
100
100
69.2
100
100
100
92.3
100
100
92.3
92.3
76.9
100
100
100
100
100
100
92.3
84.6
69.2
92.3

% Correct
by Civil
84.2
84.2
84.2
100
84.2
100
84.2
84.2
84.2
100
84.2
94.7
94.7
89.5
84.2
78.9
84.2
100
100
57.9
94.7
94.7
94.7
89.5
73.7
100
100
100
94.7
100
89.5
84.2
89.5
78.9
94.7
94.7
100
94.7
94.7
100
78.9
73.7
52.6
42.1

Item
Discrimination
Ratio for
Forensic and
Civil
1.10
1.00
1.19
1.00
1.10
1.00
0.91
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.91
1.06
1.06
1.03
1.19
1.27
1.19
0.92
1.00
1.20
1.06
0.97
1.06
1.12
0.94
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.97
1.00
1.12
1.10
1.03
0.97
1.06
1.06
1.00
1.06
1.06
1.00
1.17
1.15
1.32
2.19

% Correct
by
Competent
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
71.4
85.7
100
85.7
100
100
85.7
100
100
100
85.7
100
42.9
100
85.7
100
100
57.1
100
100
100
100
100
100
85.7
85.7
85.7
100
100
100
100
100
100
85.7
71.4
85.7
85.7

% Correct
by
Incompetent
100
66.7
100
100
100
100
66.7
100
100
100
33.3
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
66.7
100
100
100
100
66.7
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
33.3
100

Item
Discrimination
Ratio for
Competent and
Incompetent
1.00
1.50
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.50
0.71
0.86
1.00
2.57
1.00
1.00
0.86
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.86
1.00
0.43
1.00
0.86
1.00
1.00
0.57
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.50
1.00
1.00
0.86
0.86
1.28
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.86
0.71
2.57
0.86
(continued)

INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

99

Table 6 (continued)
Item Discrimination Statistics
Item
Item
Discrimination
Discrimination
Ratio for
% Correct
% Correct
Ratio for
% Correct
% Correct
Forensic and
by
by
Competent and
Item by Forensic
by Civil
Civil
Competent
Incompetent
Incompetent
45
100
94.7
1.06
100
100
1.00
46
92.3
47.4
1.95
100
100
1.00
47
100
89.5
1.12
100
100
1.00
48
100
100
1.00
100
100
1.00
49
92.3
89.5
1.03
85.7
100
0.86
50
92.3
84.2
1.10
100
100
1.00
51
100
89.5
1.12
100
100
1.00
52
100
100
1.00
100
100
1.00
53
100
100
1.00
100
100
1.00
54
100
78.9
1.27
100
100
1.00
55
100
73.7
1.36
100
100
1.00
56
92.3
84.2
1.10
85.7
100
0.86
57
100
94.7
1.06
100
100
1.00
58
92.3
100
0.92
100
100
1.00
59
69.2
78.9
0.88
71.4
100
0.71
60
92.3
84.2
1.10
85.7
100
0.86
61
100
94.7
1.06
100
100
1.00
Note. Item discrimination was calculated by dividing the percentage of correct responses from
forensic/competent participants by the percentage of correct responses from civil/incompetent patients.
Ratios greater than 1 indicate that forensic/competent participants had a higher percentage of correct
responses, ratios less than 1 indicate that civil/incompetent participants had a higher percentage of correct
responses, and ratios equal to 1 indicate that both groups had the same percentage of correct responses.
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Table 7
Item Analysis for Forensic Sample
Item
Corrected Item-Total Correlation
1
0.031
2
0.214
3
--4
--5
0.134
6
--7
0.296
8
-0.091
9
-0.017
10
--11
0.296
12
--13
--14
0.567
15
--16
--17
--18
0.567
19
--20
0.455
21
--22
0.567
23
--24
--25
0.192
26
--27
--28
--29
0.134
30
--31
--32
0.239
33
0.567
34
-0.039
35
--36
--37
--38
--39
--40
--41
0.567
42
0.633
43
0.192
44
-0.362
45
--46
0.031
47
--48
--49
-0.070
50
0.134
51
--52
---

100

Alpha-If-Item-Deleted
0.657
0.643
----0.649
--0.633
0.672
0.665
--0.633
----0.616
------0.616
--0.611
--0.616
----0.647
------0.649
----0.641
0.616
0.672
------------0.616
0.598
0.647
0.684
--0.657
----0.664
0.649
----(continued)
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Table 7 (continued)
Item Analysis for Forensic Sample
Item
Corrected Item-Total Correlation
Alpha-If-Item-Deleted
53
----54
----55
----56
0.567
0.616
57
----58
0.134
0.649
59
0.069
0.662
60
-0.070
0.664
61
----Note. Corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values are only reported if all participants
did not respond in the same way to the item.
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Table 8
Item Analysis for Civil Sample
Item
Corrected Item-Total Correlation
1
0.257
2
0.404
3
0.086
4
--5
0.171
6
--7
0.614
8
0.286
9
0.315
10
--11
0.493
12
0.350
13
0.072
14
0.142
15
-0.109
16
0.601
17
-0.082
18
--19
--20
0.603
21
0.072
22
0.072
23
0.587
24
-0.057
25
0.764
26
--27
--28
--29
0.587
30
--31
0.109
32
0.374
33
0.042
34
0.438
35
0.587
36
0.303
37
--38
-0.199
39
0.587
40
--41
0.280
42
0.045
43
0.493
44
-0.099
45
0.072
46
0.220
47
0.313
48
--49
0.700
50
0.404
51
0.109
52
---

102

Alpha-If-Item-Deleted
0.807
0.803
0.812
--0.810
--0.796
0.806
0.805
--0.800
0.806
0.811
0.810
0.818
0.795
0.817
----0.793
0.811
0.811
0.801
0.815
0.788
------0.801
--0.811
0.804
0.813
0.801
0.801
0.807
--0.816
0.801
--0.807
0.815
0.798
0.822
0.811
0.810
0.806
--0.796
0.803
0.811
--(continued)
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Table 8 (continued)
Item Analysis for Civil Sample
Item
Corrected Item-Total Correlation
Alpha-If-Item-Deleted
53
----54
-0.001
0.816
55
0.283
0.807
56
0.315
0.805
57
-0.064
0.814
58
----59
0.465
0.800
60
0.029
0.814
61
0.303
0.807
Note. Corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values are only reported if all participants
did not respond in the same way to the item.
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Table 9
Item Analysis for Competent Defendants
Item
Corrected Item-Total Correlation
1
--2
--3
--4
--5
--6
--7
0.279
8
-0.138
9
-0.107
10
--11
0.701
12
--13
--14
0.701
15
--16
--17
--18
0.701
19
--20
0.732
21
--22
0.701
23
--24
--25
0.514
26
--27
--28
--29
--30
--31
--32
0.279
33
0.701
34
-0.348
35
--36
--37
--38
--39
--40
--41
0.701
42
0.836
43
0.279
44
-0.463
45
--46
--47
--48
--49
-0.107
50
--51
--52
---

104

Alpha-If-Item-Deleted
------------0.753
0.788
0.778
--0.724
----0.724
------0.724
--0.711
--0.724
----0.733
------------0.753
0.724
0.792
------------0.724
0.704
0.753
0.798
--------0.778
------(continued)
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Table 9 (continued)
Item Analysis for Competent Defendants
Item
Corrected Item-Total Correlation
Alpha-If-Item-Deleted
53
----54
----55
----56
0.701
0.724
57
----58
----59
0.158
0.765
60
-0.107
0.778
61
----Note. Corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values are only reported if all participants
did not respond in the same way to the item.
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Table 10
Item Analysis for Incompetent Defendants
Item
Corrected Item-Total Correlation
1
--2
0.918
3
--4
--5
--6
--7
0.918
8
--9
--10
--11
0.655
12
--13
--14
--15
--16
--17
--18
--19
--20
--21
--22
--23
--24
--25
--26
--27
--28
--29
0.918
30
--31
--32
--33
--34
0.918
35
--36
--37
--38
--39
--40
--41
--42
--43
0.655
44
--45
--46
--47
--48
--49
--50
--51
--52
---

106

Alpha-If-Item-Deleted
--0.921
--------0.921
------0.952
----------------------------------0.921
--------0.921
----------------0.952
------------------(continued)
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Table 10 (continued)
Item Analysis for Incompetent Defendants
Item
Corrected Item-Total Correlation
Alpha-If-Item-Deleted
53
----54
----55
----56
----57
----58
----59
----60
----61
----Note. Corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values are only reported if all participants
did not respond in the same way to the item.
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Figure 1
Distribution of ILK Total Scores for Forensic and Civil Samples

Distribution of ILK Total Scores for Forensic and Civil Samples
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CHAPTER SEVEN
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